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Abstract:  
 
Do cultural values enhance financial and subjective well-being (SWB)? Taking a 
multidisciplinary approach, we meta-analytically reviewed the field, found it thinly covered, and 
focused on individualism. In counter, we collected a broad array of individuallevel data, 
specifically an Internet sample of 8,438 adult respondents. Individual SWB was most strongly 
associated with cultural values that foster relationships and social capital, which typically 
accounted for more unique variance in life satisfaction than an individual’s salary. At a national 
level, we used mean-based meta-analysis to construct a comprehensive cultural and SWB 
database. Results show some reversals from the individual level, particularly masculinity’s facet 
of achievement orientation. In all, the happy nation has low power distance and low uncertainty 
avoidance, but is high in femininity and individualism, and these effects are interrelated but still 
partially independent from political and economic institutions. In short, culture matters for 
individual and national well-being. 
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Article: 
 
The American Psychological Association ushered in the millennium with the Decade of 
Behavior and a call to promote “a healthier nation, a safer nation, a better educated nation, a 
more prosperous nation and a more democratic nation” (Azar, 2000, p. 10). A decade later, in the 
Academy of Management Perspectives special issue on international happiness, Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2011) concluded, “this multidisciplinary research field is, and will remain, one of 
genuine significance to human society. Almost everyone is interested in happiness” (p. 19). 
Indeed, variations of subjective well-being (SWB)—assessments along the lines of satisfaction, 
happiness, or the quality of life—are among the most frequently posed criteria in all the social 
sciences (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Ryan & Deci, 2001). Whereas satisfaction 
reflects more of a cognitive evaluation of one’s life, the assessment of happiness includes an 
affective element, drawing more on emotions though still retaining a cognitive component. 
Combined, satisfaction and happiness is referred to as SWB. Collectively, we as individuals 
assess and predict SWB for life in general as well as each of its domains, such as family and 
work. Our obsession is well justified. 
Multiple philosophical traditions from both East and West contend that a life well led can 
be considered an end in itself (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011; Oishi, Graham, Kesebir, & 
Galinha, 2013), and leading a good life should include attending to SWB (Diener & Lucas, 
1999). For example, SWB is at the core of economics (especially welfare economics) where it is 
referred to as utility, a measure of relative satisfaction. Aside from its inherent worth, satisfaction 
also affects a host of other critical areas (Huppert, 2009). In the workplace alone, job satisfaction 
influences almost every outcome, including motivation, effort, organizational citizenship 
behavior, interpersonal relationships, group identification, commitment, and ultimately 
performance (Erdogan, Bauer, Truxillo, & Mansfield, 2012; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 
2001; Mount, Ilies, & Johnson, 2006). 
Despite notable progress, we still have an evolving and presently imperfect understanding 
of what creates SWB. We focus here on one relatively understudied area that can be applied to 
individuals and nations: culture. Though culture is a complex multilevel construct and dozens of 
definitions of culture have been offered, it generally refers to shared and relatively stable values 
(cf. Taras, Rowney, & Steel, 2009). Essentially, culture is to nations what personality is to 
individuals, though it is not limited to the national level and extends to organizational and 
individual levels. Stressing its potential relevance, there are several qualitative reviews on the 
direct, mediating, and moderating effects of culture on SWB (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003; 
Spector, 1997), and in a chapter reviewing national differences in SWB, Diener and Suh (2003) 
conclude that “culture norms appear to be promising candidates for factors that influence SWB 
beyond wealth” (p. 444). 
To advance our understanding of SWB, we take a multilevel approach. Most models 
differentiate between levels of culture such as individual, group, organizational, and national; 
layers of culture such as artifacts, practices, and values; and dimensions of cultural values and 
practices such as power distance or individualism (Hofstede, 1980; House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Schwartz, 1994; Trompenaars, 1993). Cross-cultural psychology and 
management models of culture commonly, though not exclusively, focus on national cultural 
values (Taras et al., 2009; Taras & Steel, 2009). Although there is no definitive model of culture, 
the most widely used and enduring, as well as the one repeatedly applied to the topic of well-
being, is Hofstede’s (1980) four-dimensional typology: individualism–collectivism, power 
distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Taras et al. (2009) reviewed more than 120 
instruments for measuring culture and noted that almost all of them contain one or more of 
Hofstede’s original cultural dimensions. A brief definition of these four cultural values follows. 
Individualism–collectivism, or simply individualism, is the best studied of all cultural 
dimensions, referring to the degree that people are expected to pursue their own interests over 
those of the group (Hofstede, 2001). Power distance is the degree to which a person expects and 
accepts inequality in status and power (Hofstede, 2001). Those higher in power distance believe 
there should be sharp divides between superiors and subordinates, with power holders entitled to 
considerable privileges and influence. Uncertainty avoidance has two different expressions. The 
first is valuing order and consistency over experimentation and innovation; rules and explicit 
instructions are preferred (House et al., 2004). The second is the degree to which people are 
made nervous by situations they perceive as unstructured, unclear, or unpredictable (Hofstede, 
2001). Like uncertainty avoidance, masculinity–femininity is also multifaceted, reflecting the 
degree to which masculine values such as assertiveness, toughness, and concern with material 
success are emphasized versus feminine values such as modesty, caring, harmony, and a focus 
on improving the quality of life. In addition to these values, House et al. (2004) contend that 
there is the subdimension of gender egalitarianism or differentiation, reflecting the degree that 
distinct gender roles are encouraged or enforced (e.g., “Meetings are usually run more effectively 
when they are chaired by a man”). 
Though Hofstede intended his cultural typology to represent national culture, the four 
dimensions have been successfully applied to individuals and to subcultures (cf. Taras, Kirkman, 
& Steel, 2010). For example, Erez and Gati’s (2004) multilevel model of culture suggests both 
top down and bottom up processes allowing for unique properties at each level. Consequently, 
we conduct and contrast two quantitative lines of research on culture and SWB: one focused on 
the individual and one at the national level, using meta-analytic data as well as original research 
to fill in relevant holes and extend the field. At the individual and nation levels of analysis, we 
establish the relevancy of using cultural values to better understand SWB by also considering 
any redundancy to other dominant explanations, particularly wealth. We start with the individual 
level as our baseline, establishing the cultural dimensions assessed. At the national level, we 
review what findings are expected to be consistent or homologous with individual-level results, 
what is expected to differ, and why. We analyze how culture affects SWB overall and across 
different types of cultural values and different facets of SWB. In all, we establish cultural 
profiles of satisfied individuals and happy nations, emphasizing that these two are not necessarily 
the same. 
 
Study I: Individual Level of Analysis 
 
Despite its origin as an individual-level employee attitude survey at IBM, the appropriateness of 
using Hofstede’s cultural typology at an individual level has often been questioned (Taras et al., 
2009). In their review on values and personality, Parks and Guay (2009) argued how both are 
related and important, but deserve separate study as each affects motivation through different 
pathways. Later, Taras et al. (2010) meta-analytically demonstrated that cultural values could be 
meaningfully applied at the individual level. And as both Parks and Guay as well as Taras et al. 
(2010) noted, compared to personality traits, much less individuallevel research has been done 
with values, with the majority relying on the Hofstede model and then focusing only on 
individualism. As Taras et al. (2010) concluded, “[individualism] did not have any meaningful 
predictive power differences compared to the other three values, and its overall predictive power 
was about average” (p. 23). 
 Although comparatively less than with personality traits, there is an established line of 
research exploring values at the individual level (e.g., Oishi, Diener, Suh, & Lucas, 1999). We 
begin by establishing that culture can be relevant beyond wealth for understanding SWB, 
focusing on the satisfaction aspect at the individual level. Afterwards, we consider the cultural 
dimensions of individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity in turn. 
 
Wealth and Culture 
 
From an economic perspective, satisfaction should be largely a function of wealth or objective 
economic status; as our purchasing power increases, so do our choices, which should be 
exercised in a way that maximizes our happiness. However, multiple meta-analytic reviews 
report a modest, diminishing correlation between SWB and economic status or income of 0.20 or 
0.13 depending on the local economic development (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2009; Howell & 
Howell, 2008), which leaves substantial room for further explanation. Individual differences 
have provided strong prediction of SWB, particularly personality (Steel, Schmidt, & Schultz, 
2008). Given the established relationship between personality and values (Parks & Guay, 2009; 
Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002), values should demonstrate somewhat similar findings. 
Several mechanisms are suggested. First suggest that simply having certain values improves 
SWB, such as valuing compassion over security (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). Second, values often 
drive behavior (Schwartz, 1994; Verplanken & Holland, 2002), and the outcomes of behavior 
inherently influence SWB. Third, aside from outcomes, there is the pursuit of value-related 
goals, of which values can influence how intrinsically satisfying they can be (Oishi et al., 1999). 
In all, we expect culture to incrementally predict SWB above and beyond wealth. 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Culture will incrementally predict satisfaction above wealth. 
 
Individualism 
 
Reflecting the priority of self over group interests, measures of individualism often assess the 
desire to work alone rather than with others (Maznevski, DiStefano, Gomez, Noorderhaven, & 
Wu, 2002). Individualism is positively associated with introversion, correlating at −.32 with 
extraversion (Migliore, 2011). Accordingly, we can borrow from personality research, which 
shows a dependable negative relationship between introversion and SWB (Steel et al., 2008). A 
related line of research is the “Belongingness Hypothesis,” which argues that being an accepted 
member of a group is a fundamental need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and individualism 
inherently creates tension with belongingness’ fulfillment. We predict, 
 
 Hypthesis 2: Individualism is negatively associated with satisfaction. 
 
Power Distance 
 
Power distance’s theorized relationship with SWB is mixed. At the individual level, a close 
analog of power distance may be authoritarianism. Despite the negative interpersonal qualities of 
the trait, which is likened to a cyclist (i.e., bow up but kick down), there is a positive association 
between general authoritarianism and SWB (MacInnis, Busseri, Choma, & Hodson, 2013). On 
the other hand, power distance also parallels the social dominance construct (Ekehammar, 
Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004) as well as Schwartz’s (1994) cultural value of hierarchy. In 
accordance with Bilsky and Schwartz’s (1994) theory that extrinsic values are negatively related 
to SWB, SWB’s relationship with hierarchy was negative but nonsignificant (Haslam, Whelan, 
& Bastian, 2009). A meta-analysis of psychological well-being and social dominance orientation 
along with other conservative or rightwing attitudes found the same weakly negative but 
nonsignificant relationship (Onraet, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2013). Consequently, we expect the 
same. 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Power distance is weakly but negatively related to satisfaction. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
As reviewed, uncertainty avoidance has a rule orientation facet (e.g., “Company rules should not 
be broken”) but also an anxiety facet (e.g., “Do you feel nervous or tense at work?”). The 
primary mechanism relating uncertainty avoidance to happiness should be the latter, reflecting 
stress, anxiety, and neuroticism (Hofstede, 2001; Taras et al., 2009). Neuroticism, in particular, 
is the personality trait that best predicts SWB at both an individual and national level of analysis 
(Steel & Ones, 2002; Steel et al., 2008). 
 As per its close relationship with neuroticism, anxiety is often viewed as a personality 
facet rather than a cultural value. Consequently, many measures of uncertainty avoidance focus 
solely on the rule orientation aspect (e.g., Ang, Van Dyne, & Begley, 2003; Dorfman & Howell, 
1988; House et al., 2004), perhaps rightly so. Desire for rules and order is essentially a moral 
value, related to the Kantian or deontological worldview (Timmons, 2007). Deon comes from the 
Greek meaning duty, and deontological theories are concerned with moral obligations, rather 
than consequentialist or utilitarianism theories, which are concerned with outcomes. 
Accordingly, believing in the primacy of rules in determining morality (e.g., “Obey the rules no 
matter what”) is firmly associated with right-wing attitudes (r = .72) and moderately associated 
with uncertainty avoidance (r = .37; Morin & Dick, 2015). Indeed, high uncertainty avoidance 
individuals tend to be conservative, concerned for law and order, and uncomfortable with 
ambiguity or diversity (cf. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Notably, this may help 
explain why those with a conservative political stance tend to have higher levels of SWB (Napier 
& Jost, 2008; Onraet, Van Hiel, & Cornelis, 2013), which is intensely debated (Van Hiel et al., 
2015). In sum, given that conservatives, with their stronger need for order, are happier and the 
related trait “Need for Order” correlates positively at .14 with SWB (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998), 
we predict, 
 
Hypothesis 4: The anxiety facet of uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with 
satisfaction whereas its rule orientation facet is positively associated.  
 
Masculinity 
 
Masculinity can be examined at an overall factor level, and at more precise facets level including 
(a) achievement orientation (i.e., concerns with success), (b) future orientation (i.e., working 
hard for success), and (c) gender inegalitarianism (i.e., preference for male rather than female 
leaders; Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2012). For the overall factor, we expect feminine individuals 
to be happier. To begin with, masculinity is strongly connected to materialism, with some 
viewing the two constructs as synonymous (Best & Williams, 2001), and materialistic values 
(e.g., “Money and material things are important”) are problematic for well-being. Though 
materialistic consumption can increase happiness, the increase is typically temporary. Described 
as a hedonic treadmill, it creates short-term rises in happiness that quickly dissipate (i.e., hedonic 
adaptation). For example, Chancellor and Lyubomirsky (2014) review multiple mechanisms, 
including how shoppers can become addicted to the process of acquiring, moving from one rush 
to the next. Consequently, the long-term effects of materialism are less encouraging. In some of 
the seminal work in the consumer behavior area, Belk (1985) found that the relationship between 
materialism and the level of self-reported happiness is negative, with higher levels of materialism 
leading to lower levels of happiness. This finding has been replicated in numerous samples 
across a range of nations (e.g., Dittmar, Bond, Hurst, & Kasser, 2014). 
 At the facet level, the relationship between masculinity and well-being becomes more 
mixed and potentially controversial. On one hand, traditional sex role attitudes or gender 
inegalitarianism has a dependably negative association with SWB (Wong, Ho, Wang, & Miller, 
2017). On the other, future orientation has an unambiguously positive relationship with SWB, 
being associated with impulse control and lack of self-regulatory failure (Steel & Weinhardt, 
2017). 
 Achievement orientation’s relationship to SWB, however, is less certain. From a 
psychological perspective, achievement orientation is argued to have a positive relationship with 
SWB as it facilitates “achievement of tasks” (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998, p. 199). Although the 
meta-analytic relationship is positive (r = .15), it is based on just 590 mostly student respondents 
dispersed among nine studies, with some results showing a negative relationship (for similar 
student-based results, see Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Sheldon & Schüler, 2011). Using a general 
population sample, Baumann, Kaschel, and Kuhl (2005) found a stronger negative relationship 
between achievement orientation and SWB (r = −.19). Also, Tamir et al. (2016) found across 
eight separate world cultures that the more people identified with selfenhancement values of 
power and achievement, the more they sought the emotional states of anger and contempt. 
Graham (2011) and Becchetti and Rossetti (2009) argued from an economic perspective that 
although achievement orientation can increase salary, it can be detrimental to SWB as it creates 
rising expectations also referred to as the “happy peasant and frustrated achiever” problem. 
Becchetti, Trovato, and Londono Bedoya (2011) noted that with wealth comes coordination 
problems regarding relationships, where those who are actively pursuing success find it harder to 
arrange time to socialize effectively. Similarly, Pouwels, Siegers, and Vlasblom (2008) noted 
that although income has a positive benefit on SWB, this can be offset somewhat by the hours 
required to earn it. Diener, Ng, and Tov (2008) also found evidence against the utility of an 
extreme work focus, using the economist concept of declining marginal utility to argue for a 
balance among a mixture of activities (e.g., home, leisure, work). In short, people who choose 
time over money tend to be happier (Hershfield, Mogilner, & Barnea, 2016). Given the stronger 
theoretical support from economics and the possibility of weaker results from student samples, 
we propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Masculinity, especially its achievement orientation facet, is negatively 
related to satisfaction. 
 
A Framework of Individual Culture and Wealth 
 
Summarizing the bivariate relationships previously explicated, we present Figure 1. Consistent 
with Diener and Suh’s (2003) contention that culture may predict SWB beyond wealth, all 
cultural dimensions are depicted with direct pathways to SWB, though masculinity also has an 
indirect pathway through wealth. We consider uncertainty avoidance at its more precise facet 
level: anxiety and rule orientation. The rule orientation is depicted in gray as though it was 
hypothesized to be positive; our later results did not support this conclusion. 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized relationships at the individual level among the cultural dimensions, 
including the uncertainty avoidance facets of rule orientation and anxiety, with wealth and SWB. 
Note. The gray arrow was not empirically confirmed. SWB = subjective well-being. 
 
Individual-Level Method 
 
Meta-Analytic Literature Search 
 
The literature search is part of a still ongoing meta-analytic research program beginning in 2006 
and involved several contributors. In 2006, we initially started with a review of 28 relevant 
journals for publications containing data suitable for the meta-analysis that appeared after the 
publication of Hofstede’s “Culture’s Consequences” in 1980 and then proceeded with a search of 
academic paper depositories, including Google Scholar, EBSCO, PsycINFO, ERIC, ProQuest, 
and ProQuest Digital Dissertations electronic databases. Third, the reference sections of each 
article being coded were reviewed for links to publications potentially containing data for the 
meta-analysis (i.e., an ancestry approach). Fourth, using the “cited by” function of the Web of 
Science and Google Scholar databases, publications citing articles coded for our meta-analysis 
were identified and those containing relevant data were included in our data set (i.e., a 
descendancy approach). Finally, as a part of a larger metaanalytic project, we sent out a call via 
the Academy of International Business and Academy of Management list servers for studies that 
utilized Hofstede’s (1980) or similar frameworks to assess effects of culture in various areas, 
including communication from which we received more than two dozen responses. At present, 
our meta-analytic database has grown to 604 studies containing codable data on the cultural 
values of study participants. Of those, 48 contained data on the relationship between culture and 
SWB, which were included in the present study 
 
Inclusion criteria. A common challenge in meta-analysis is that the summarized studies rarely 
utilize identical research design and methodology (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). Scale length 
modification (e.g., 1 to 5 modified to 1 to 7), change in the sequence of the survey items, and 
other minor differences are not likely to lead to a substantial alteration of the construct. 
However, if the studies are substantively different, aggregation becomes questionable, leading to 
the so-called “apples and oranges” problem (Sharpe, 1997). 
 To deal with the issue of commensurability, we relied on content validation where 
multiple coders determined if instruments were similar by conducting a thorough item analysis. 
This established meta-analytic methodology has been successfully utilized in earlier meta-
analyses (Steel et al., 2008; Steel & Taras, 2010; Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010). To minimize 
inconsistencies, we attempted to be as conservative as possible when making our inclusion 
decisions. That is, when in doubt we excluded a measure, opting for omission over errors of 
commission. 
 Only studies that defined and operationalized cultural values consistently with the model 
and methods used by Hofstede (1980) qualified for inclusion. The choice was straightforward for 
the studies that used various versions of Hofstede’s original Values Survey Module (VSM). 
Studies that used other instruments to quantify cultural values required a thorough item 
evaluation and content analysis of individual survey instruments as dimension names are not a 
reliable indicator of measure consistency (Taras et al., 2010). Upon closer inspection, not all 
studies that used Hofstede’s terminology qualified for inclusion. For example, inspection of 
items included in Wagner and Moch’s (1986) individualism–collectivism measure revealed that 
the instrument was designed to measure attitudes to teamwork, which is related but not identical 
to the same type of individualism as defined by Hofstede (1980, 2001). Therefore, studies using 
this instrument for operationalizing culture were excluded from our pool. On the other hand, we 
found a few instruments that used terminology different from that introduced by Hofstede but 
evaluated largely overlapping constructs. For example, a review of the items in the measure of 
independent and interdependent self-construal developed by Singelis (1994) revealed that they 
were closely related to Hofstede’s definition of the construct of individualism–collectivism (e.g., 
“Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me”; “I will sacrifice my self-interest 
for the benefit of the group I am in”), and thus included in our meta-analytic sample. 
 The issue of commensurability was particularly salient for the individualism–collectivism 
dimension as the terms have been used broadly and inconsistently (Oyserman, Coon, & 
Kemmelmeier, 2002). Additional controversy surrounding the construct arises from some post-
Hofstede research suggesting that individualism and collectivism may not represent the extremes 
of a single continuous dimension, but are two independent bipolar dimensions (e.g., Gaines et al., 
1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1994). We utilized the unidimensional approach used in earlier meta-
analyses of Hofstede’s framework (Steel & Taras, 2010; Taras et al., 2010). First, Hofstede’s 
(1980) original model is based upon individualism–collectivism as a single bipolar dimension. 
Hofstede’s original instrument provided a single individualism score derived by combining 
responses to two survey items representing individualistic tendencies and two items representing 
collectivistic tendencies. Second, 79.2% of the studies in our meta-analytic sample that included 
separate individualism– collectivism measures reported correlations between satisfaction and 
individualism that had the opposite sign to the correlations between collectivism and the same 
facets of satisfaction. That not only strengthens the argument that empirically individualism is 
the opposite of collectivism, but also shows that it would be redundant to report the results for 
the effects of individualism and collectivism separately, being mirror images. Therefore, we 
converted separate scores for individualism and collectivism to a single composite index by 
taking an average of the sum of the individualism score and the reversed collectivism score. 
 For SWB, commensurability was less of an issue. We parsed SWB into three domains: 
life, family, and work. Though happiness and satisfaction are at times considered different 
dimensions of well-being, with the former having a more emotional slant, they are often treated 
as equivalent at both an individual and national level (Steel & Ones, 2002; Steel et al., 2008). At 
an individual level, overall well-being was measured exclusively with the Satisfaction With Life 
Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985; five items, e.g., “In most ways my life is close 
to my ideals” or “I am satisfied with my life.”). For simplicity, we refer to combinations of 
happiness and life satisfaction as just life satisfaction. Marriage or family satisfaction was 
measured with The Marriage Opinion Survey (Verma, 1989; six items, e.g., “How satisfied are 
you with your marriage?”) and the Satisfaction With Family and Friends Scale (Benet-Martinez 
& Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003; two items, e.g., “All things considered, how satisfied are you 
with your family life?). For job or work satisfaction and its facets (e.g., supervisor satisfaction), a 
wider variety of choices were employed by researchers, with emphasis on The Job Diagnostic 
Survey (Hackman & Oldham, 1975; 15 items, e.g., “Generally speaking, I am very satisfied with 
my job.”), The Job Descriptive Index (P. C. Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969; 72 items, e.g., “I am 
happy with my job.”), and The Job in General Scale (Ironson, Smith, Brannick, Gibson, & Paul, 
1989; 42 items, “My job makes me content.”). 
 Hofstede’s Value Survey Module (VSM) was used to measure cultural values in most of 
the studies included in the present meta-analysis. However, as previously discussed, studies that 
relied on instruments commensurable with Hofstede’s approach of defining and measuring the 
four cultural values were also included in our meta-analysis. Most instruments used four to six 
items per cultural dimension. Sample items for individualism–collectivism are “How important 
would it be to you to work with people who cooperate well with one another?”; for power 
distance, “How important would it be to you to be consulted by your direct superior in his/her 
decisions?”; for masculinity, “How important would it be to you to have an opportunity for 
advancement to higher level jobs?”; and for uncertainty avoidance, “How often in your 
experience, do you feel nervous or tense at work?” 
  
 Variables and data coding procedures. Although long–shortterm orientation (also known 
as Confucian dynamism) was later added to the original four Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1988), this dimension has been less popular in cross-cultural research and not enough data 
has been generated for meta-analysis. The studies that qualified for inclusion in our meta-
analytic sample explored the relationship that the remaining four cultural values had with each 
other or with a dimension of satisfaction or well-being. The final list identified five facets of 
satisfaction: satisfaction with work, supervisor, coworkers, family, and overall life satisfaction. 
Several data points describing the relationship between culture and satisfaction with 
performance, negotiation process and outcome, and organization strategy and image were coded, 
but these categories were represented by a single data point each. 
 In most cases, the relationship between culture and satisfaction variables was reported as 
a Pearson’s productmoment correlation coefficient. When publications used other measures of 
association, such as difference d-scores or F-statistics, we converted them to correlation 
coefficients (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). In addition to the main effect variables, we also recorded 
sample sizes and reported reliabilities of the instruments. All papers were coded at least twice, 
with the majority of the studies independently coded three times. Inconsistencies were resolved 
by collectively reexamining the source article, at times contacting the authors of the original 
publications for clarification, until interrater agreement reached 100%. 
 
Statistical Methods 
Our strategy was to test our hypotheses through meta-analytic structural equation modeling 
(MA-SEM), which requires a full correlation matrix, and consequently our focus was on 
calculating the needed mean effect sizes. In any case, effective explorations of heterogeneity, 
such as credibility intervals, ideally are based on at least 25 separate effect sizes per relationship 
(Steel, Kammeyer-Mueller, & Paterson, 2015), a threshold only sporadically exceeded here. We 
calculated meta-analytic average effect sizes using sample size weighting, as per Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004). These calculations were conducted with Version 14.0 of the MetaExcel software 
program (Steel, 2014). 
 
X-Culture Survey Data 
 
As is typical for any review, and as these meta-analytic results have confirmed, there are notable 
holes in the literature regarding culture and happiness or well-being. When attempting to fill out 
an entire correlation matrix meta-analytically (i.e., for MA-SEM), there are often specific 
correlations where there is little or no data. For example, as will be shown, most of the research 
has been done with job satisfaction and individualism, with little or no attention for most other 
SWB–cultural combinations. This is unwarranted. As Taras et al. (2010) concluded, “There is no 
viable reason to believe that individualism is the best predictor of organizational behavior and 
other outcomes” (p. 432). This is also problematic for conducting meta-analytic regression, 
which requires a complete matrix. 
 To address this, we conducted a mega-trial, a term from the medical field used to 
describe a study that is similar in size and breadth to a meta-analysis on the topic (Gröpel & 
Steel, 2008). Data collection for the mega-trial was nested within a large epidemiological study 
to determine the demographic characteristics of procrastinators (Steel & Ferrari, 2013) and how 
workplace characteristics influence its expression (Nguyen, Steel, & Ferrari, 2013), which 
should be referred to for further details of administration. As per Nguyen et al., results appeared 
valid and representative, consistent with similar web-based survey methodology (Gosling, 
Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). 
 
Sample. Given that student respondents, despite their convenience, are potentially less 
representative of the broad population and provide weaker results (Steel & Taras, 2010), our 
sample comprised of all respondents who reported more than 2 years of job experience or who 
identified themselves as other than students. This generated 8,438 respondents. Rounded to the 
nearest whole number, average length of employment was slightly under 7 years, 41% were male 
and 59% female, 98% had finished high school, and 50% had a college degree or higher. 
Average age was 39; 45% were single, 45% were married, and the remainder were divorced, 
separated, or widowed. As per Nguyen et al. (2013), jobs ranged from academic dean to yoga 
instructor. For job status, 5% were unemployed, 10% were presently students (i.e., those with 
more than 2 years of job experience), 15% were working part-time, 65% were working full-time, 
and the remaining 5% were retired. If unemployed or students at the time, individuals were 
instructed to think about their most recent job when responding. 
 
Measures. To further explore SWB, we expanded the dimensions assessed. On the SWB side, we 
include family satisfaction, overall job satisfaction, and its facets of pay, communication, 
coworker, and supervisor. On the cultural side, we assessed several facets of the broader cultural 
dimensions obtained from the X-Culture project, a longitudinal research program assessing 
cultural values and team performance across 40 countries (Taras et al., 2013). All measures were 
collected on a 5-point Likert-type measure ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” 
and scale reliabilities are reported along the diagonal in Table 1. Salary was measured by asking 
individuals to self-report their personal annual income into one of 10 categories ranging from 
“$10,000” to “$200,000 plus,” comparable to the nine categories of household income used by 
the U.S. census. Responses were assigned the median value within the respective category’s 
range (e.g., $55,000 for the “$50,000 to $60,000” category). Notably, because of the common 
use of salary’s logarithmic transformation in the economic field, which favors testing 
multiplicative rather than additive relationships, we compared Salary with Log Salary, finding 
both effectively equivalent, producing correlations usually within .01 of one another. The ratio of 
salary’s standard deviation to its mean, a coefficient of variation sometimes used as an indicator 
of economic inequality, though large, approximately reflects current conditions (van Treeck & 
Sturn, 2012). 
 
Cultural measures. The X-Culture project uses two individualism–collectivism scales. The first 
is adapted from Wu’s (2006) measure, focusing on group versus self-interest. One example item 
is “Group success is more important than individual success.” The other measure is Maznevski et 
al.’s (2002) Collectivism scale, which focuses on the preference to work with others rather than 
by oneself. A sample item includes “I enjoy working with others more than working alone.” To 
create an overall score, the two measures were summated and reverse-scored to be consistent in 
direction with individualism. Power distance was adapted from Wu (2006). A sample item is 
“Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates.” The rule orientation 
facet of uncertainty avoidance was measured via an adaptation of Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) 
and Wu’s (2006) scale. Similar to the GLOBE project’s definition (House et al., 2004), which 
focuses on preference for clear rules and instructions, a sample item includes “Employees 
perform better when they follow rules and instructions.” 
 Masculinity, being a focal point in this study with expected differential effects, was 
measured at its component level of achievement orientation, future orientation, and gender 
inegalitarianism, and overall. We measured achievement orientation with four items from the 
competitiveness scale of Spence and Helmreich’s (1983) Achievement Motivation Scale. A 
sample item is “Success is the most important thing in life.” Future orientation is consistent with 
the GLOBE project’s use of the term (House et al., 2004), assessing the importance of future 
goals over today’s pleasures. An example item is “People should work hard for success in the 
future.” Gender inegalitarianism was assessed via an adaptation of Dorfman and Howell’s (1988) 
and Wu’s (2006) measures. A sample item is “It is preferable to have a man in a high level 
position rather than a woman.” The overall measure of masculinity was constructed by 
aggregating these three subscales. 
 Reliability for the cultural value scales are comparable or better than those seen in the 
original scales. For example, individualism had a reliability of .63 for Dorfman and Howell 
(1988) and about .66 for Wu (2006), compared with .76 here. 
 
SWB measures. Operationalization at the individual level focused on satisfaction measures. Life 
satisfaction was assessed by Diener et al.’s (1985) Satisfaction With Life scale. A sample item is 
“I am satisfied with life.” We measured family satisfaction with Olson’s (2000) Family 
Assessment Package, supplemented with the commonly used item “All things considered, I’m 
satisfied with my family life” (e.g., Blanchflower & Oswald, 2005). Our general Job Satisfaction 
Scale was adapted from Brayfield and Rothe’s (1951) six-item scale. A sample item is “I like my 
job better than the average person.” All workplace satisfaction facet measures (i.e., pay, 
communication, supervisor, and coworker satisfaction) were measured by Spector’s (1985) job 
satisfaction survey instrument. 
 
 
 
metaBUS Data 
 
As mentioned, consistent with many measures of uncertainty avoidance, the X-Culture’s scales 
focus on the rule orientation component rather than the anxiety facet. Consequently, to test 
anxiety’s relationship with SWB, we draw upon one additional source: metaBUS (Bosco, Steel, 
Oswald, Uggerslev, & Field, 2015). The metaBUS project is an ongoing effort to archive 
correlational findings across psychology into a searchable and interactive web-based meta-
analytic platform (see www.metaBUS.org). At the time of this authoring, the database contained 
778,528 correlational effect sizes from 9,024 articles in 23 applied psychology journals from 
1980 to 2015. As per Steel et al. (2008), who found no significant differences between trait and 
state measures of affect in their SWB meta-analysis, we treated anxiety correlations based on 
both trait and state equally. The metaBUS database is analyzed using the R Statistics package 
metafor rma.mv function (version 1.9-8; Viechtbauer, 2010), which addresses sample 
dependence issues by using multilevel meta-analytic estimates with the nesting factor as sample. 
Further details on the database construction, taxonomy, and procedures are given in Bosco, 
Aguinis, Singh, Field, and Pierce (2015). Using the metaBUS data set enabled us to generate a 
complete meta-analytic matrix. The source articles used are available from the authors upon 
request and are accessible directly from the metaBUS open scientific platform. 
 As a validity check, we reviewed whether estimates are indeed in line with available 
related research. The correlations between life satisfaction and job satisfaction as well as its 
facets are all approximate meta-analytically derived averages (Bowling, Eschleman, & Wang, 
2010), though notably this study increases the field’s sample size considerably (e.g., the previous 
total meta-analytic sample size for the life and pay satisfaction relationship was 1,578 
respondents). Notably, where there was data, we also used metaBUS as another validity check of 
the intercorrelations among the SWB dimensions and salary. On average, the overlapping 
matrices from Tables 1 and 3 closely approximate each other, with an average difference of .07 
between correlations and an absolute average difference of .09. 
 
Individual-Level Results 
 
Aside from our new survey data, 48 prior studies provided measures of the relationships between 
cultural values and satisfaction for this meta-analysis. At the individual level, the data set was 
represented by 112 meta-analytic effect size coefficients, representing a total of 21,028 
individuals. On average, the respondents were 30.2 years of age with 14.7 years of education; 
60.0% of the respondents were male and 29.1% of them were students. An additional three 
studies provided the intercorrelations among cultural dimensions (N = 4,399). 
 Although meta-analytic means tend to stabilize very quickly (Murphy, 2017), meta-
analytic variance estimates are unstable with a small number of studies. Taking a Bayesian 
approach, Steel et al. (2015) found that a “low level of information contained in meta-analytic 
variance estimates based on a small number of studies” (p. 734) makes them potentially 
misleading in that they have a much higher probability of giving errant estimates of homogeneity 
as well as having little power to detect moderator effects. In any case, given our statistical 
strategy is MA-SEM, we focus on averages, which we provide in Table 1. Correlations are 
reported below the diagonal, reliabilities along the diagonal, with the number of studies and total 
sample size (in parentheses) per estimate reported above. 
 As can be seen, almost all of the data concentrates in individualism and then primarily in 
job satisfaction. The matrix is “lumpy” in distribution, reflecting that this is largely an 
underexplored area. Given the lack of and poor distribution of previous studies as well as the size 
and external validity of our survey data, we draw upon the X-Culture responses for analyses 
unless otherwise specified. 
 
Wealth and Culture 
 
To explore whether cultural values incrementally predict SWB above salary (Hypothesis 1), we 
conducted a series of twostage hierarchical regressions using the X-Culture survey data, which 
included salary information. For each SWB dimension, we allowed salary to predict first, 
followed by cultural values. Results are displayed in Table 2. The first column of results 
demonstrates the relationship between cultural values and salary. Salary, being on a ratio scale 
and having a meaningful zero value, has both standardized and unstandardized regression 
weights reported. To compare the relative impact of salary versus cultural values, the final two 
rows of Table 2 show their respective contribution. Hypothesis 1 is supported for six out of 
seven SWB indices, with the exception of pay satisfaction where the incremental R2 is less than 
1%. 
 
Individualism 
 
Individualism was negatively correlated with all aspects of SWB (see Table 1). As one might 
expect given its introverted aspects, the most negative correlation was with coworker satisfaction 
(r = −.13). Also, as per Table 2, individualism has a negative relationship with wealth. Notably, 
even after controlling for wealth, individualism negatively predicts life, family, and job 
satisfaction. Values associated with individualism and autonomy do not appear to be beneficial 
in terms of wealth or well-being at the individual level. Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
 
 
 
 
Power Distance 
 
As predicted in Hypothesis 3, power distance indeed has a weak negative relationship to 
satisfaction, with the exception of job satisfaction. This may reflect person–job fit 
(KristofBrown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). Because the workplace tends to be hierarchical 
and situationally strong (Staw & Cohen-Charash, 2005), those accepting high power distance 
could be demonstrating superior fit in this context. As per Tables 1 and 2, though negatively 
related to wealth, it predicts SWB above it. Like individualism, power distance does not appear 
to be beneficial in terms of wealth or wellbeing at the individual level. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
 
The relationship between uncertainty avoidance and SWB is largely unexplored, with the meta-
analytic record relegated to two relationships: job satisfaction and supervisor satisfaction. To 
address Hypothesis 4, which predicted a negative relationship between anxiety and SWB, we use 
the metaBUS database. As per Table 3, correlations between the anxiety facet and dimensions of 
SWB are uniformly negative and, on average, −.18 stronger than the rule orientation dimension, 
in keeping with predictions. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 postulated that those who are 
highly rule oriented should also tend to be happier. Though the anxiety facet was indeed more 
negatively related to SWB than rule orientation, rule orientation was still uniformly negative, 
with an average correlation of −.03 across all SWB indices in Table 1. Though rule orientation 
dilutes anxiety’s negative association with SWB, reducing uncertainty avoidance’s overall 
association, it does not counteract it. Hypothesis 4 is rejected. 
 
Masculinity 
 
To examine Hypothesis 5, which predicted that masculinity, including its achievement 
orientation facet, would be negatively related to satisfaction, Tables 1 and 2 reveal that 
masculinity is positively connected to salary, which in turn predicts satisfaction across the board. 
Despite this positive association with salary, masculinity is negatively related to all forms of 
satisfaction with the exception of pay. Finding support for Hypothesis 5, we followed this up by 
focusing on masculinity’s facet of achievement orientation. As per Table 2, achievement was 
either not associated or negatively associated with satisfaction, which includes pay satisfaction 
itself. That is, though the facet is associated with higher salary, it is also associated with greater 
dissatisfaction with that salary. 
 Given this finding, we conducted an additional analysis. As Van der Meer and Wielers 
(2013) describe it, “Hours of work or effort is regarded as disutility that needs to be compensated 
to seduce workers to come to work” (p. 359). Parttime workers should be about as happy as full-
time workers, assuming their work status is voluntary, due to their added leisure opportunities. 
As shown in Table 4, this is approximately correct. Although some disutility can be expected for 
those seeking full-time work but unable to find it, the SWB differences between full-time and 
part-time workers can be characterized as extremely small, except for pay satisfaction. 
 
Individual-Level Discussion 
 
In terms of explaining variance in individuals’ SWB, researchers have extensively studied a 
variety of individualdifference factors (Pavot & Diener, 2011; Steel et al., 2008) and 
environmental factors (Argyle, 2003; Kesebir & Diener, 2008), with wealth being of particular 
interest. However, as the meta-analytic record confirms, the study of cultural values and 
satisfaction at the individual level is relatively unexplored, at least with Hofstede’s dimensions. 
 Though culture is related to wealth, Diener and Suh (2003) asked if culture predicts SWB 
above it. Salary dependably predicts SWB, especially and unsurprisingly pay satisfaction. The 
size of these relationships are in line with Howell and Howell’s (2008) and Diener and Biswas-
Diener’s (2009) meta-analyses, which together reported an average correlation between SWB 
and economic status of approximately .17 (compared with the .18 reported here), or Judge, 
Piccolo, Podsakoff, Shaw, and Rich’s (2010) meta-analysis, which reported an average 
correlation of .14 between pay and job satisfaction (compared with the .13 found here). 
However, if the relationship between salary and SWB is of interest, then by influence alone, 
culture is even more interesting, with it accounting for more variance everywhere but pay 
satisfaction. In general, cultural values that are associated with socialness or enhanced 
interpersonal relationships incrementally predicted above salary. Among the stronger findings, 
lower individualism is associated with a happier life and especially more coworker satisfaction, 
consistent with recent investigations into social capital (Helliwell, Huang, & Wang, 2014; Lange, 
2015). 
 Consistent with feminine values leading to warm, interpersonal relationships, 
masculinity’s achievement orientation facet, despite being associated with more pay, is 
associated with less satisfaction across the board, including less pay satisfaction. In all, 
achievement orientation’s relationship with salary and satisfaction supports the “happy peasant 
and frustrated achiever” perspective. Efforts to increase income, such as hours worked, can 
deprive one of other SWB-enhancing experiences, such as relationship building. As we found, 
although being unemployed is substantively detrimental to well-being compared with being 
employed (cf. Helliwell & Huang, 2014), these differences almost disappear when reaching part-
time employment. 
 
 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
Though we addressed several issues here, we still have an emerging understanding of how values 
relate to outcomes. Though not the focus of our study, masculinity’s facet of gender 
inegalitarianism was among the best predictors of reduced satisfaction, supporting its further 
study (Wong et al., 2017). Similarly, masculinity’s future orientation facet (i.e., preparing for 
tomorrow today) deserves fresh attention. More than achievement orientation, the future 
orientation facet appears to explain most of masculinity’s connection to wealth. In fact, future 
orientation appears to be among the best trait predictors we have of salary so far. A one standard 
deviation decrease in future orientation was associated with a decrease in salary of 
approximately $9,000, placing it between agreeableness (Judge, Livingston, & Hurst, 2012) and 
procrastination (Nguyen et al., 2013), which respectively decrease salary by approximately 
$7,300 and $10,700 for each standard deviation increase. 
 Also, we hypothesized that the rule orientation facet would help counteract the anxiety 
aspect of uncertainty avoidance, helping to explain why those who identify themselves as 
conservative (which tend to be higher on uncertainty avoidance) still tend to be happier overall. 
Although rule orientation’s weak correlation with SWB dilutes anxiety’s stronger association, 
both are negative and our hypothesis here was not supported. Looking elsewhere for 
enlightenment, Napier and Jost (2008) argue conservatives are happier partly because “inequality 
takes a greater psychological toll on liberals than on conservatives, apparently because liberals 
lack ideological rationalizations that would help them frame inequality in a positive (or at least 
neutral) light” (p. 571). Does this explanation suffice? To more thoroughly investigate this and 
other alternatives, we need to examine a more complete palette of cultural values, such as the 26 
popular facets of culture reported by Taras et al. (2009). If all these values could be closely 
examined, a more definitive understanding should emerge. For example, two values may be 
associated and often seen together but have opposing effects. Last, there is the direction of 
causality issue, which correlational research cannot definitively resolve. Though values are 
somewhat more malleable than personality traits (Parks & Guay, 2009), both are largely stable 
individual differences, meaning that the causal process should go from values to behaviors to 
outcomes, such as life satisfaction (Schwartz, 1994; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Still, this 
does not preclude more complicated reciprocal relationships, where a happy life is more 
conducive to developing specific values or where happiness is a cause of wealth itself (e.g., 
Zelenski, Murphy, & Jenkins, 2008). 
 
Study 2: National Level 
 
Concern for the well-being of individuals has naturally expanded into concern for the well-being 
of groups, particularly nations. Though there is a long and contentious history of using subjective 
social indicators to inform public policy (Allin & Hand, 2014; Noll, 2013), Diener’s (2000) 
formal proposal of a national well-being index was particularly well received, with several 
measures of Gross National Happiness (GNH) proposed or now in existence (Delhey & Kroll, 
2013; Oishi & Schimmack, 2010; Tideman, 2011). GNH attempts to address measurement 
deficits in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), an economic indicator of material wealth that 
assesses the buying and selling of products and services. For example, Frey (2008) reviews that 
increases in illness, disasters, and pollution (“regrettables”) can perversely increase GDP, as we 
purchase services to address these setbacks. On the other hand, leisure time, maintaining a 
household, or community volunteerism does not increase GDP as money does not change hands. 
GDP as an indicator of societal success also assumes that we are uniformly rational in our 
decision-making. This position belies a well-established body of self-regulatory limitations and 
cognitive biases, including procrastination, where we irrationally put actions off despite 
expecting to be worse off (Steel & Weinhardt, 2017). The impact of procrastination alone ranges 
from the financial, where we put off saving for retirement or dealing with debt, to the medical, 
where we put off adopting healthier lifestyle changes or investigating the initial symptoms of 
escalating conditions. 
 Despite the limitations of GDP, consideration of the GNH was once controversial as neo-
classical economists contend that directly measuring happiness (i.e., cardinal utility) is not just 
difficult, which it can be, but impossible and/or unnecessary. However, as Frey and Stutzer 
(2002) conclude, advances in measurement and validation has “helped to make the new idea of 
measuring utility palatable” (p. 21). Consequently, economic factions have arisen that are 
receptive to GNH, including behavioral economics and real-world or “postautistic” economics, 
in that they describe the neo-classical “mind-blindness” position here as “autistic” (Fullbrook, 
2007). Its present level of acceptance is such that it is being used to inform legal policy (Huang, 
2010) and several prominent economists are editors of the “World Happiness Report” (Helliwell, 
Layard, & Sachs, 2013), which reviews and advocates for direct measure of well-being as part of 
the “dashboard” that gauges societal health and informs public policy. Similarly, Diener (2013) 
reports, “In 2013, the Organization of Economic Cooperation, which provides guidance to 
countries on the collection of national statistics, provided nations with guidelines for national 
accounts of SWB” (p. 665). Based on this acceptance and emerging national databases, the 
extensive research into well-being conducted at an individual level is now being replicated at a 
national level, where both environmental and group characteristics are being explored (e.g., 
Diener, Diener, & Diener, 1995; Diener & Seligman, 2009; Steel & Ones, 2002). 
 Although a number of earlier studies have explored the relationship between culture and 
satisfaction (e.g., Diener & Diener, 1995; Judge, Parker, Colbert, Heller, & Ilies, 2001; T. W. H. 
Ng, Sorensen, & Yim, 2009), the results have often been inconsistent and, at times, conflicting. 
In this nationallevel systematic review, similar to our individual-level analysis, we reexamined 
the issue of culture and well-being not only by summarizing the meta-analytic data but with new 
data as well, that is three novel databases, one for culture and two for SWB. This multivariate 
data set enables us to establish the combined relationship among cultural dimensions and allows 
us considerable freedom to revisit previous hypotheses, including whether culture’s relationship 
with SWB varies among life domains. As the national data sets are segmented by decade, we can 
also determine whether the results sustain over several time periods. As Taras et al. (2012) 
concluded, “The criterion validity of Hofstede’s scores tends to deteriorate over time” (p. 337). 
Data from earlier decades does not necessarily reflect a country’s cultural values from 
subsequent decades, with indices temporally matched tending to have higher correlations than 
those mismatched. 
 We replicate and extend the individual-level analyses conducted with wealth, SWB, and 
culture. As before, we start by confirming the relevance of culture though this time at the 
national level, where it is argued to be epiphenomenal not only to wealth but also to political 
institutions. We end by considering the degree of homology or isomorphism between individual 
and national levels of analysis. 
 
Culture, Wealth, and Governance 
 
Governance is a broad concept regarding how power is used for a country’s development and 
includes concepts of “control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, rule quality, 
political stability, and voice and accountability” (Langbein & Knack, 2010, p. 350). Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012), arguing from their own respective disciplines, contend that governance 
effectiveness and national prosperity is exclusively due to political and economic institutions 
acting reciprocally, creating either a virtuous or vicious circle. Essentially, they are espousing 
Political Process Theory, where “Political and economic structures of society are viewed as 
determining, while culture is treated as separate from structure and secondary in importance” 
(Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008, p. 75). Certainly, some skepticism of culture is warranted; 
Hofstede (2001) himself wrote regarding “hard variables,” specifically mentioning GDP per 
capita, if they can “predict a country variable better, cultural indexes are redundant” (p. 68). On 
the other hand, the explanatory power of GDP itself can be questioned. For example, the 
Easterlin Paradox refers to the debated relationship between national economic wealth or growth 
and happiness, with arguments ranging from absent, short-term, or indirect (Easterlin, 2013) to 
positive but with diminishing returns (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008). 
 As reviewed by Kara and Peterson (2012), Functional Theory and Neo-Institutional 
Theory indicate that culture and institutions are intimately and also reciprocally linked, 
representing a pathway through which each are influenced as well as formed by each other (e.g., 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2010; Voigt & Park, 2008). Often studied under the term of “informal 
institutions,” others have shown that culture is important to the development of a wide variety of 
national-level financial systems (Dutta & Mukherjee, 2012; Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & 
Kwok, 2012), with Zhao, Shen, and Collier (2014) showing that national culture has a direct 
impact on the adoption of e-government practices (i.e., use of information technology in service 
delivery). Consequently, Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2007) in their own study of culture 
and governance argue, somewhat presciently, that many institutional reforms will fail or be 
extremely slow to take root in countries that lack a complementary cultural base, with culture 
this time creating “vicious circles of underdevelopment” (p. 682). Consistent with Diener and 
Suh’s (2003) position, we maintain that though economic and political institutes are tightly 
linked to culture, culture should be modeled separately and has the potential for unique 
influence. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Culture will independently predict SWB, having both direct pathways to 
SWB and indirect pathways through GDP and governance effectiveness. 
 
Individualism, Wealth, and SWB 
 
Despite the weak, negative connection at the individual level, individualism is expected to be 
strong and positive at the national level. To begin with, the relationship between individualism 
and extraversion appears to reverse at the national level. Although preference for solitary work 
indicated introversion at the individual level, at the national level individualism has a strong, 
positive relationship (r = .64) with extraversion (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). The relationship 
between national extraversion and SWB is dependably positive (Steel & Ones, 2002). 
 Furthermore, Steel and Taras (2010) make the case that national-level individualism is 
largely caused by national wealth and Hofstede (2001) describes the connection between 
individualism and wealth as “really remarkable” (p. 251), noting that wealth increases freedom 
by allowing people to “do their own thing” (p. 253). Recent research also shows that as 
developing countries such as India and China become wealthier and freer, they also experience a 
shift toward individualist values (Shah, 2009). Given the tight connection between individualism, 
wealth, and freedom, we would expect individualistic countries to be happier because richer and 
freer countries are happier (Diener et al., 1995). As Diener and Diener (1995) review, there are a 
variety of pathways by which wealth can increase happiness, primarily through what goods and 
services we can purchase. Wealth allows us to pursue options that better satisfy our needs and 
desires. Again, the economic critique would be that individualism is simply an epiphenomenon, 
an outcome of wealth that fails to independently account for any increase in happiness. This is 
plausible, but as Diener and Diener note, “National income substantially predicts individual 
SWB beyond the effects of individual income, again suggesting that additional variables such as 
human rights and equality might increase positive experience in wealthier nations” (p. 132). One 
of these “additional variables,” Diener and Diener suggest, is individualism. 
 There have been several attempts to disentangle the relationships that individualism, 
wealth, and freedom have with happiness. At a national level, Inglehart, Foa, Peterson, and 
Welzel (2008) report “a growing sense of free choice from 1981 to 2007 seems to be the core 
reason why SWB has risen” (p. 274). Minkov (2009) found that “the main predictor of the 
cognitive facet (life satisfaction) is a perception of life control, followed by wealth” (p. 152). 
Similarly, Fischer and Boer (2011) reported that “increasing wealth in a society may influence 
wellbeing but primarily through allowing citizens to experience greater autonomy and freedom 
in their daily life” (p. 177). Notably, they also found that individualism was a better predictor of 
well-being than wealth, largely because it better enables increased autonomy. 
 Aside from direct effects, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) suggest that individualism has 
both mediating and moderating properties with wealth (i.e., mediates between wealth and 
political change). Fischer and Boer (2011) tested several models using national indices of 
negative SWB (e.g., burnout, anxiety), finding most support for the moderating effect, that 
individualism expresses itself interactively with wealth. That is, happiness is improved by having 
both the financial means and the social license to make use of the choices it enables. In short, 
though wealth may theoretically provide you with more options, without individualistic values, 
your social obligations can prevent you from freely pursuing them. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Individualism predicts, and interacts with wealth to incrementally predict, 
SWB. 
 
Power Distance, Wealth, and Governance 
 
High power distance is not a desirable quality. Power distance is related to the Gini (Taras et al., 
2012), an economic measure of inequality developed by the Italian sociologist Corrado Gini. The 
correlates or indirect effects that economic inequality can have on happiness are numerous (Oishi 
& Kesebir, 2015; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), but particularly relevant is its deleterious 
relationship to societal levels of mental and physical health (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Just as power 
distance is at an individual level, economic inequality is associated with less national wealth, not 
more (e.g., Benabou, 1996; Burtless & Jencks, 2003). Though there are many possible reasons 
for wealth concentration (Keister, 2014), this can include economic “rent seeking,” where 
privilege protects and perpetuates itself by preventing effective competition that is “almost 
always at the expense of the middle and lower classes” (Phillips, 2003, p. 476). Consequently, 
extremes of inequality are associated with impaired health, education, social relations, and 
politics (Neckerman & Torche, 2007). Although related, power distance is a broader construct 
than economic equality. It includes equality of opportunity and equality before the law (i.e., “rule 
of law” instead of “rule by law”). To the extent that it covers equal access to services that 
improve the worth of human capital, notably education (Thurow, 1999), lower power distance 
should lead to greater wealth. 
 Oishi, Kesebir, and Diener (2011) highlight two mechanisms through which power 
distance can lower SWB. First, inequality promotes feelings of injustice or envy, studied under 
the term social comparisons (cf. Festinger, 1954). For example, Easterlin (2001) thought that 
social comparisons may eventually make wealth effects on happiness a zero-sum situation, 
where we end up back in the same place “because both income and aspirations rise, with roughly 
offsetting effects on well-being” (p. 473). A complete negation is likely an overstatement, but 
“the ‘preference shift’ through higher individual income is found to ‘destroy’ 60–80 percent of 
the expected welfare effect of an increase in income” (Frey, 2008, p. 40) and “it is clear that they 
[concerns with position] are also the source of a great deal of misery in the world” (Frank, 1999, 
p. 121). Those high in power distance should receive less hedonic benefit from their wealth. 
Second, inequality can erode trust and belongingness, key components of a satisfied life (e.g., 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Empirically, Steel and Ones (2002) reviewed the strong negative 
relationship between trust and national happiness, noting that distrust is related to defensiveness 
or suspicion of others. As Putnam (2000) stressed in his seminal book Bowling Alone, distrust 
erodes social capital and feelings of community. 
 In addition, power distance is argued to be causally related to governance. Per Inglehart 
and Welzel’s (2010) human development sequence, the emergence of self-expression values 
(e.g., defiance to authority) leads to the rise of democratic institutions. In this case, desire for 
equality should lead to activism and protest which in turn has the potential for political reform 
(Cohen & Valencia, 2008; Polletta, 2008; Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, & Andersen, 2009). For 
example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) discuss how political change is assisted by political 
protest, such as Prime Minister Earl Grey’s step toward universal suffrage during Britain’s 1831 
election. On the other hand, nations more accepting of hierarchy are less likely to question 
authority, and the subsequent reduced transparency leads to more opportunity for favoritism and 
corruption (Husted, 1999). Consistent with this, high power distance is strongly associated with 
the lack of political freedom (Taras et al., 2012). We predict, 
 
Hypothesis 8: Power distance is negatively connected to SWB, partly mediated by GDP 
per capita and governance effectiveness indicators. 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance, SWB, and Governance 
 
Uncertainty avoidance has the clearest connection to SWB of all the cultural dimensions, with 
Hofstede (2001) describing low well-being as one of the defining characteristics of high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures. Related to the personality trait neuroticism (Hofstede & McCrae, 
2004), Steel and Ones (2002) reviewed why the relationship should be stronger at a national 
level, highlighting emotional contagion (where bad moods are infectious). For similar analyses 
using U.S. states, see Rentfrow, Mellander, and Florida (2009). 
 In addition, countries higher in uncertainty avoidance tend to be more politically corrupt, 
with both Terror Management Theory and System Justification Theory suggesting a reciprocal 
relationship (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Steel & Taras, 2010; Van den Bos, 
2009). Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir (2009) explored system justification theory to explain why the 
underprivileged and the oppressed not only tolerate underlying political and social systems, but 
“defend and justify disparities of income and other resources as fair, legitimate, necessary and 
inevitable” (p. 8). They reasoned that those higher in uncertainty avoidance tend to look for 
clarity and rules, taking comfort in the certainty of the status quo. As Rehnquist (2000) 
concluded, they trade liberty for security, though perhaps end up with neither. 
 Janoff-Bulman (2009) as well as Storm and Wilson (2009) discussed how this response is 
meant to be adaptive. Liberal and conservative value systems are both responses filling separate 
socioecological niches. A liberal focus is approach based, focusing on social justice, maximizing 
a group’s welfare (especially the well-being of others). A conservative focus is avoidance based, 
focusing on protecting the group from threats, maintaining order, and heightened uncertainty 
avoidance. From this perspective, the observed strong association between threats and right-wing 
attitudes would partly be a consequence of uncertainty avoidance, a value system arising from 
the assessment of a dangerous world. In situations of threat, emphasis on authoritarianism, 
unquestioned loyalty, and hierarchy may be adaptive, explaining why there is an emphasis of 
these values, for example, within the military culture (Soeters, Winslow, & Weibull, 2003). This 
connection between perceived peril and values has been repeatedly observed elsewhere, with 
Greenberg et al. (1997) concluding in their review of terror management theory that “cultural 
worldviews ameliorate anxiety by imbuing the universe with order and meaning” (p. 65). 
Subsequent examples include exposing people to threats or having them ruminate over their 
mortality increases conservative attitudes (Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Shaffer & Hastings, 2007); 
those more susceptible to fear tend to be more conservative (Oxley et al., 2008); and the 9/11 
terrorist attacks contributed to subsequently shifting American politics toward authoritarianism 
and conservative values (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Huddy & Feldman, 2011). 
 However, because this relationship can be reciprocal, the causal arrow can reverse as it 
can be desirable for governments to foster uncertainty avoidance. Fear can make a populace 
more politically manageable, with special emphasis on the “War on Terror” (Manwell, 2010; 
Mythen & Walklate, 2006). In H. L. Mencken’s (1949) words, “The whole aim of practical 
politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it 
with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary” (p. 29). In short, those higher in 
uncertainty avoidance will tolerate less democratic and more authoritarian political systems and 
authoritarian political systems consequently benefit from fostering uncertainty avoidance. 
Accordingly, we predict, 
 
Hypothesis 9: Uncertainty avoidance is negatively connected to SWB, partly mediated by 
governance effectiveness. 
 
Masculinity, Wealth, and SWB 
 
Masculinity is expected to have direct and indirect effects with SWB. At a national level, 
masculinity tends to be associated with neuroticism (r = .57) and negatively with agreeableness 
(r = −.36; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Consequently, feminine societies tend to be concerned 
with establishing and nurturing warm personal relationships, caring for others, and explicitly 
increasing quality of life. Repeatedly, social capital in terms of group membership, social trust, 
volunteering, or altruistic leanings are strongly associated with national SWB (Calvo, Zheng, 
Kumar, Olgiati, & Berkman, 2012; Oishi & Schimmack, 2010; Tov & Diener, 2008), with the 
strength of the relationship growing over time (Bartolini & Sarracino, 2011). And, even after 
controlling for GDP per capita and religiosity, masculinity is associated with lower levels of 
social capital (Kaasa, 2015). 
 Furthermore, efforts to create rewarding relationships and supportive communities (i.e., 
social capital) increase the well-being of individuals as well as the group. As Steel and Ones 
(2002) reviewed, “Group-level affect results from the combination of the group’s affective 
composition plus the affective context in which the group is behaving” (p. 769). Consequently, 
being concerned with the quality of life of others is by definition a positive externality, likely 
manifesting itself at a societal level with a comprehensive social safety net (Arrindell et al., 
1996), which in turn is associated with higher levels of SWB (Easterlin, 2013). In this way, 
countries with an increasingly progressive taxation system tend to be happier because, as Oishi, 
Schimmack, and Diener (2012) found, their citizens “were more satisfied with public and 
common goods, such as the quality of education and the availability of health care” (p. 89). 
 Indirectly, masculinity might have a relationship with SWB through wealth. Considered 
one of the founding texts in economic sociology, Weber (1904/2001) posited that economic 
growth was due to the Protestant work ethic, which is conceptually close to masculinity. 
Specifically, he argues that some countries use child-rearing practices that promote 
independence, delay of gratification, and competence—qualities that help create citizens with 
strong achievement orientation. In turn, such high achievers are more likely to become 
successful entrepreneurs who create new businesses that expand the economy. The most 
influential proponent of this position is D. C. McClelland (1961), where in his book The 
Achieving Society he found a correlation of .53 between achievement orientation and subsequent 
economic growth in his sample of 22 countries. Following in these footsteps, Ferguson (2011) 
colorfully argues that the prosperity of the West was due to six “downloadable” largely cultural 
“apps,” such as work ethic, competition, and consumerism/materialism. 
 On the other hand, historical analysis of Weber’s thesis is widely unsupported, with any 
connection often attributed to literacy rather than work ethic, and Cantoni (2015), along with his 
own analysis, noting “innumerable rebuttals” (p. 565). The same can be said for D. C. 
McClelland (1961). Generally speaking, McClelland’s methodology was so unusual that many 
explicitly suspected that his choices were made post hoc to create his desired findings (e.g., 
Lewis, 1991; Schatz, 1965). For example, he used electrical output growth rather than GDP 
growth as his criterion, a single change among several others that would reduce his findings to 
nonsignificance. Later attempts at replication are also dismissive (Gilleard, 1989; Lewis, 1991; 
Mazur & Rosa, 1977), including a particularly comprehensive attempt by Beugelsdijk and 
Smeets (2008). Similarly, Mishra’s (2011) review of Ferguson’s (2011) book on this topic and its 
Weberism leanings ranges between skeptical and scathing in tone. On balance, this is potentially 
a good example of the social dilemma, where values good for the individual is mistakenly 
generalized to being good for the nation (discussed in detail in the following section “Cultural 
Isomorphism”). 
 Similarly in dispute is the relationship that masculinity has with governance. That is, 
though the technical quality of government colludes with national happiness (Helliwell & 
Huang, 2008; Ott, 2010), government spending as a percentage of GDP eventually collides, 
resulting in a negative relationship (Bjørnskov, Dreher, & Fischer, 2007; Knoll & Pitlik, 2014; 
Oishi et al., 2011). In the short run, Okulicz-Kozaryn, Holmes, and Avery (2014) review 
Livability Theory, where government expenditures on improving living conditions are observed 
to increase SWB. In the long run, Davidson, Pacek, and Radcliff (2013) argue this could change. 
Although finding that efforts to create a “socialistic” economy, as reflected by increased labor 
market regulation and the decommodification of the work force, was associated with a happier 
population, they review how extremely feminine cultures are hypothesized to eventually create 
an overtaxed and less happy welfare society. Indeed, as Hofstede (2001) notes, countries that 
emphasize protecting the weak and maintaining equality (i.e., low masculinity and power 
distance) are more likely to limit economic freedom, possibly adversely impact long-term 
growth, and may introduce excessive regulation that itself reduces SWB (Gehring, 2013). As 
illustration, consider the Canadian province of Quebec, which has extensive social services and 
concomitantly high levels of life satisfaction, both substantively higher than the rest of Canada 
(Barrington-Leigh, 2013). It also has the highest level of per capita debt and highest debt service 
costs (Speer, 2014), despite already receiving federal transfer or equalization payments 
approaching 10 billion dollars annually, which calls to question the long-term sustainability of 
this path (Dubuc, 2014). 
 Because of this, masculinity’s relationship with SWB may be complex and perhaps 
moderated by wealth. Arrindell (1998) found that masculinity correlated positively with well-
being for poor countries but negatively for rich countries. As he describes it, richer countries can 
more easily maintain the costs of social services and their advantages to well-being. Balancing 
services with economic productivity thus becomes a focus. A masculine, production-focused 
society can generate or protect wealth but when wealthy it is less likely to make investments that 
increase quality of life (e.g., public parks). On the other hand, a feminine, welfare-focused 
society can make expenditures that nominally increase collective well-being but also overwhelm 
its capacity, where entitlements lead to austerity. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Masculinity, especially achievement orientation, is negatively connected 
to SWB and partly moderated by GDP per capita. 
 
Cultural Isomorphism 
 
There is considerable confusion in the cultural field regarding the relationship between 
individual-level and group or national-level results. The fear of committing either the ecological 
fallacy or the reverse ecological fallacy, otherwise known as the atomistic or individualistic 
fallacy, “has almost precluded any attempts at ecological inference, that is bridging levels of 
analysis in cross-cultural studies” (Steel & Taras, 2010, p. 214). The ecological fallacies, reverse 
and otherwise, occur only when findings are specific to the level of analysis, which happens 
sporadically but not consistently. Because relationships among aggregate data tend to be higher 
than the relationships among corresponding individual data elements (Klein & Kozlowski, 
2000), the direction of these relationships is often homologous (Steel & Ones, 2002). 
Furthermore, as Jargowsky (2004) noted, “Aggregate data may be better than individual data for 
testing hypotheses, even if those hypotheses are about individual behaviour” (p. 721). Can we 
expect the same here? 
 Several chapters of van de Vijver, van Hemert, and Poortinga’s (2008) book Multilevel 
Analysis of Individuals and Cultures address the issue of homology or isomorphism across 
levels, with the consensus being that homology is context dependent. Certainly, cultural findings 
are capable of both, either staying consistent or shifting, as the focus goes from the individual to 
the nation. On one hand, Veenhoven (2009) concluded that individual and societal values 
regarding well-being tend to be in harmony. On the other hand, Taras, Steel, and Kirkman (2010) 
review how value–practice correlations are negative at the national level though positive at the 
individual. Oishi (2012) reviews this phenomenon, noting there is a large interdisciplinary effort 
to study this under general terms such as “individual-group discontinuity” (p. 175). 
 One example of individual–group discontinuity is the social dilemma, where what is 
good for the individual may not be good for the group. This has public policy implications, 
where ideological principles inspired by personal success are inappropriately presented as a 
template for the nation. The classic example of this is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where two 
individuals pursuing what is best for themselves end up collectively in the worst of all possible 
situations. In general, we expect reversals when precisely this occurs, that is when people pursue 
individual achievement without regard to its impact on the group. There are several other 
culture-related examples of this. SWB is linked to having a conservative political stance at the 
individual level and though this may be associated with desirable personality traits at a work or 
local neighborhood level (Stankov, 2009; Stern, 2013), nations with more liberal policies (e.g., 
decommodification of the labor market or a larger social safety net) tend to be happier (Flavin, 
Pacek, & Radcliff, 2014; OkuliczKozaryn et al., 2014). Similarly, system justification research 
indicates that values can provide a buffer against dissatisfaction with the status quo (Jost et al., 
2007; Liviatan & Jost, 2011). Essentially, our feelings about inequality are largely determined by 
the degree of perceived procedural fairness; if societal position is seen as largely based on talent 
and effort, they become more positive (Alesina, Di Tella, & MacCulloch, 2004), but if the gaps 
are sufficiently large and persistent to signal systematic disadvantage to the poor, they become 
more negative Graham & Felton, 2006). 
 Potentially, the social dilemma can occur with both individualism, which emphasizes 
self-interest, and with masculinity, which emphasizes competition over cooperation. However, 
individualism is problematic as being wealthy itself creates individualism at a national level. The 
strength of this connection is such that it likely obscures any potential reciprocal relationship, 
where national individualism would reduce national wealth. Masculinity, on the other hand, 
appears unencumbered by such issues. 
 Consequently, we expect homology to typically occur in terms of direction, though the 
strength of the relationship should be much stronger at the national level. One emphasized 
exception to this trend of isomorphism is masculinity, where the direction of the relationship is 
expected to reverse at the national level. 
 
Hypothesis 11: When contrasting individual- and national-level results, with the 
exception of masculinity, homology in direction between cultural values and prosperity 
as well as SWB should predominantly occur, with results stronger at the national level of 
analysis. 
 
A Framework of Culture, Wealth, and Governance 
 
Summarizing these positions, we present Figure 2, with many of the basic bivariate relationships 
previously explicated. Economic institutions that create wealth and political institutions that 
prevent corruption are intertwined and should be strongly related (Svensson, 2005), though each 
has the potential for a separate impact on SWB (Dorn, Fischer, Kirchgässner, & Sousa-Poza, 
2007; Pryor, 2009). Masculinity should lead to reduced SWB, but as just mentioned, this 
relationship may be itself moderated by wealth. Wealth should have direct and indirect effects 
with SWB, moderated by individualism. Governance should be related to both power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance, though uncertainty avoidance should incrementally predict SWB 
above governance given its strong connection to anxiety. 
 In short, we expect a happy culture to be lower in power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
and corruption while higher in individualism and wealth. Masculinity may be more desirable for 
poorer countries while femininity might be better suited for richer countries. Whereas the effects 
of culture may be mediated through political and economic institutions, they should also account 
for incremental variance. 
 
 
Figure 2. Summary of hypothesized major relationships among national SWB, cultural values, 
and political and economic institutions. Note. SWB = subjective well-being. 
 
National-Level Methodology 
 
For the meta-analytic data, we followed the same coding and statistical procedures as for Study 
1. At a national level, results were primarily obtained either with a version of Veenhoven’s 
World Happiness Database (e.g., Veenhoven, 2011) or Michalos’ (1991) survey of college 
students, which averaged results from both happiness and life satisfaction. Hofstede’s original 
indices, being openly available, have been correlated with SWB several times (e.g., Basabe, 
Paez, & Valencia, 2002; Hofstede, 2001) and to maintain independence of data, we included one 
instance of these analyses. Of note, the available data permitted summary of all five facets in the 
individual-level analysis but only four in the nationallevel analysis (i.e., work, supervisor, 
coworker, and life satisfaction). 
 
Wealth and Governance Indices 
 
Good economic institutions lead to a wealthy nation. As a summary of these economic 
institutions’ output, we use GDP per capita, relying on data from the World Bank, expressed in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP puts national currencies into a common metric, the 
U.S. dollar, in terms of the ability to purchase the same goods and services. Consistent with 
Study 1’s logarithmic transformation for salary, a logarithmic transformation of per capita GDP 
did not improve its relationship with SWB. To measure national debt, we used total central 
government debt as a percentage of GDP, available from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). For the decades of 1990 and 2000, data were available 
for 30 of our countries or regions. To measure governmental effectiveness or governance, we 
used the same corruption indices as Taras et al. (2012), that is Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (Ahmad & Aziz, 2001), which is a compendium of other surveys 
and indices (e.g., The International Country Risk Guide; cf. http://www.transparency.org/ 
research/cpi/overview). These indices typically are based on subject matter experts answering a 
series of corruption- and governance-related questions (e.g., “Has the government implemented 
effective anti-corruption initiatives?”). The correlation of our governance/corruption index with 
overlapping data of Government Effectiveness, as measured by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators Project and compiled back to 1996 (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011), was .96 
for the 2000s, which is typical of the high level of convergence among governance indicators 
(Langbein & Knack, 2010), such as Versteeg and Ginsburg (2017) reporting indices .95 and 
above for a variety of rule of law indices. Similarly, previous investigation by Licht et al. (2007) 
shows that each of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, respectively, produces very similar results 
whether correlated with indices for governance, corruption, or rule of law. 
 
Culture and National Well-Being Indices 
 
To assess culture and happiness at a national level, we relied on several databases. For culture, 
Taras et al. (2012) metaanalytically compiled a database, spanning from the 1970s-1980s to the 
2000s, updating Hofstede’s cultural indices by drawing on subsequent administrations of 
Hofstede’s VSM or other surveys that proved to be functionally equivalent. As per Taras et al. 
(2012), “It is difficult to conceive of better results that indicate equivalence” (p. 3). Taras et al. 
then validated these indices against a wide range of related indices, such as income inequality 
with power distance. As they note, “A series of validity checks indicate that our updated cultural 
scores are more accurate than those offered by Hofstede” (p. 11). To assess the masculinity facet 
of achievement motivation, we drew upon Mõttus, Allik, and Realo’s (2010) database of 
conscientiousness national mean scores, where achievement motivation is nested. The correlation 
between self-reports of achievement motivation and observer reports (McCrae & Terracciano, 
2008) is .60, making it the most agreed upon aspect of conscientiousness. 
 For SWB, we aggregated the 2010 version of Veenhoven’s (2011) World Database of 
Happiness (WDH). The WDH is an archive for surveys done on SWB at a national level, such as 
the Gallup polls or Eurobarometer series. As Steel and Ones (2002) summarize, it has been 
aggregated and subsequently validated several times previously (e.g., Myers & Diener, 1996), 
with evidence indicating that the results are appropriate for cross-cultural investigations. The 
WDH sorts the different surveys by a variety of categories, including scale length (e.g., 1 to 5), 
question type (e.g., “How happy are you?”; “How satisfied are you?”), and sample 
characteristics (e.g., general vs. student). All the survey results are transformed into a 0 to 10 
common metric (Veenhoven, 2009). For further discussion of the WDH, Diener et al. (1995) 
provide a comprehensive description. 
 The main issue regarding aggregation is commensurability. There is a natural tension 
between the size or completeness of the database and the method variance it contains. The more 
relaxed the inclusion criteria, the larger the database’s size but also the measurement error. On 
the other hand, aggregating similar measures essentially creates a distinct source design 
(Kammeyer-Mueller, Steel, & Rubenstein, 2010), which decreases measurement error but at the 
cost of a smaller database and reduced generalizability. To address this, we needed to eliminate 
or separate substantively different ways of measuring SWB. To this end, we excluded student 
populations, who proved to provide significantly different results from the general population 
(Steel & Ones, 2002), and separated results depending on whether the question posed focused on 
happiness, satisfaction, or affect. We also aggregated scales that correlated with the database at 
.70 or higher. 
 We used linear equating to supplement the already transformed 0 to 10 scales provided in 
the WDH. To linearly equate the scales, we calculated individual standard deviations and means 
for the two target scales, derived from a sample of common respondents (Angoff, 1971). In our 
case, the common respondent was a general population sample assessed by two or more types of 
scales in a given year. For example, the population of Denmark was assessed by five different 
types of SWB scales in 2007. To maximize overlap among scales, we proceeded with a 
“spreading inkblot” strategy of aggregation. We started with untransformed scales as our “seed” 
scale or gold standard, such as the “11 Step Numeral Happiness” (i.e., 0-10 happiness scales). 
Survey results missing sample sizes were replaced with the mean average sample size for that 
scale. Using sample size weighting and averaging, we then aggregated a minimally transformed 
but highly correlated scale such as “10 Step Numeral Happiness,” which correlates with “11 Step 
Numeral Happiness” at .90. This provided a larger database and greater overlap to linearly 
equate more scales. We also aggregated scales that correlated with the database at .70 or higher, 
resulting in three SWB indices: Happiness, Satisfaction, and Overall SWB. 
 The happiness index comprised of five happiness scales along with a “Delighted–
Terrible” scale that correlated with the overall happiness index at .89. The satisfaction index 
comprised of six satisfaction scales along with a “Best– Worst” scale that correlated at .75 with 
the overall satisfaction index. The average correlation of the scales comprising the overall index 
with the index itself was .98 for happiness and .91 for satisfaction, which reflects agreement 
among the measures as well as unique Nation–Year combinations assessed by only one scale. An 
affect scale was not developed as there were not enough instances to provide a meaningful index 
by decade. Finally, though happiness and satisfaction are at times treated as separate constructs, 
the results from a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression between the two provided a 
correlation of .71, above our threshold for aggregation. Consequently, we also provide an overall 
SWB scale comprised of both happiness and satisfaction. 
 Given the depth of the database, we were able to assess the test–retest reliability of the 
scale by comparing all nation scores on the overall SWB scale that were from 1 to 10 years apart, 
correcting for range restriction and weighting by sample size. We only included correlations 
based upon 5 or more data points. Using WLS regression, we get a predictable decrease in the 
correlation by degree of separation, starting with a constant of .87 for adjacent years and then 
decreasing −.01 for each additional year of separation, R2 of .48, F(1, 8) = 7.44, p = .03. This 
provides a sufficient average test–retest correlation among country scores to justify aggregation 
across broad timespans. Consequently, we developed indices for SWB, happiness, and 
satisfaction, matching the countries, regions, and timespans used by Taras et al. (2012) in their 
cultural value database: 1970s to 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. As a reliability check, we correlated 
our overall results with Diener et al.’s (1995) SWB index, based on data from the 1980s and 
earlier. As expected, the correlation decreased with years of separation. For the 1970s to 1980s, r 
= .85, for the 1990s, r = .64, and for the 2000s, r = .62. Evaluation of similar national accounts of 
well-being was reviewed by Diener, Inglehart, and Tay (2013), who found them to be generally 
valid and useful for directing public policy. 
 Building on this technique, we assembled an international job satisfaction database by 
converting results from an extensive series of governmental social surveys. These surveys 
included British Social Attitudes Surveys, Eurobarometer series, European Quality of Life 
Surveys, European Social Surveys, European Values Study, Canada’s General Social Surveys 
and National Graduate Surveys, International Social Survey Program, Japanese General Social 
Surveys, Polish General Social Survey, Quality of Life Diagnosis in Romania, Scottish Social 
Attitudes Surveys, Social Change in Canada, General Household Surveys, New Baltic 
Barometer, and the World Value Surveys. Aggregation was simplified by the general 
homogeneity in question type. Surveys typically asked, “How satisfied are you with your job?” 
or minor deviations thereof. All scales were converted to a common metric of 1 to 10, with 1 
being least satisfied. We considered Eskildsen, Kristensen, and Antvor’s (2010) proprietary 
European Employee IndexTM measure of job satisfaction, finding it correlates at .29 with our 
data set and consequently excluded it. 
 We also examined the degree that these national-level indices reflected response biases. 
The effect of these potential biases is uncertain (Tov & Au, 2013). Typically, two selfreport 
measures, such as culture and SWB, will have their relationship inflated by sharing 
nonsystematic error variance (common method variance), whereas relationships between a self-
report and observed measure, such as GDP per capita, would have their relationship artificially 
decreased (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). This may be a concern as some response 
style scores, though typically post hoc derived, have been shown to correlate with country-level 
culture and SWB variables (Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Van Dijk, Datema, Piggen, 
Welten, & van de Vijver, 2009). To test for the presence of response bias, we used the national 
acquiescence and extreme response bias measures of P. B. Smith and Fischer (2008), testing 
them against our SWB, cultural, economic, and political indices for each decade. Of the 60 
correlations, only three were significant, all from the 1970s to 1980s decade: power distance, 
individualism, and notably GDP per capita. These appear to be spurious given that (a) we would 
expect at least three to be significant by chance (i.e., 1 in 20), (b) these correlations occur during 
a different decade of when the response biases indices were obtained, and (c) acquiescence 
correlates strongly with our observed measure of GDP per capita (i.e., r = −.47, based on 28 
countries). Possibly, the absence of a substantive response bias in our data set reflects its 
metaanalytic nature, which averages the effects derived from several surveys. In their review 
article, Podsakoff et al.’s (2012) first recommendation for reducing method bias is simply to 
obtain measures from different sources and, given the nonsystematic format and item wording 
among surveys, sources of error may have effectively cancelled each other out (i.e., error has a 
mean of zero). Still, other response bias indices may prove to generate more dependable 
correlations (e.g., He, Van de Vijver, Espinosa, & Mui, 2014). Even if so, interpretation of such 
a finding is unclear. These aforementioned post hoc derived response bias indices typically have 
correlations with objective economic and political measures, such as income inequality or 
democratization, which exceed that seen with self-report measures, including culture or SWB, 
making interpretation extremely complicated. At the national level, response bias does not 
unambiguously represent error, something erroneous to be removed or controlled for, but can be 
a meaningful construct that may indeed reflect other constructs of interest (He et al., 2014). Also, 
Conway and Lance’s (2010) research indicates that the substantive effect of common method 
variance is essentially zero as it helps to compensate for measurement error, which tends to have 
a stronger attenuating effect. 
 A fully estimated data set, with every country having an estimate for every year of its 
existence from 1970 to 2010, would have approximately 6,000 data points. The overall SWB has 
1,096 data points, each based on an average of 4,894 respondents. The happiness index has 655 
data points, based on an average of 4,336 respondents each. The life satisfaction index has 725 
data points, each based on an average of 3,385 respondents. The job satisfaction index has 267 
data points, with an average of 3,817 respondents for each. A summary of the SWB indices is 
provided in Table 5. 
National-Level Results 
 
The national-level data set comprised of 44 meta-analytic effects representing 1,230 original data 
points. Average sample size, accordingly, was 29 countries per study. Like the individual-level 
analysis, results centered on the role of individualism comprising 44% of all studies, and on life 
satisfaction, comprising 42% of all studies. As per Table 6, at the national level of analysis, the 
overall meta-analytic absolute effect size was 0.38, which is considerably stronger than the 
absolute effect size of 0.06 observed at the individual level of analysis. As reviewed, this was 
expected, with correlations typically increasing in strength at larger levels of analysis or 
aggregation. The strength of the effect varied across facets of the culture and satisfaction 
constructs. Across cultural dimensions estimated with at least 20 nations, job satisfaction had the 
strongest correlation, −.53 with uncertainty avoidance, but also the weakest, −.10 with 
masculinity. The research record for coworker and supervisor satisfaction is extremely sparse, 
with unexpected negative correlations for coworker and supervisor satisfaction with 
individualism. This reflects not only the low number of nations in most analyses but also that 
sample sizes that obtain national SWB and culture averages can be relatively small. 
 Addressing these limitations, we move to our meta-analytic mean-level analysis. Being 
based on much of the raw data that comprised the correlations in Table 6, we did not incorporate 
these correlations in our estimates (as this would have the same information counted twice). In 
total, 48 countries or regions had both SWB data and cultural value data, which is much larger 
than the research done previously between SWB and cultural values and, as Oishi (2012) 
reviews, this is slightly larger than the average study that correlated GDP per capita and SWB, 
which usually uses fewer than 45 countries. Table 7 provides the intercorrelations for overall 
SWB, Happiness, Life Satisfaction, Job Satisfaction, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Individualism, Masculinity, GDP per capita, and Governance for three time periods: 1970s to 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. 
 As can be seen, the results are very stable across all three time periods and are aligned 
though stronger than the previous meta-analytic data. The average absolute correlation between 
culture and SWB and job satisfaction from Table 6 is .35 and .31 respectively, but from Table 7 
it is .44 and .43. Similarly, Oishi (2012) summarizes 19 studies that give an average sample size 
weighted correlation of .64 between SWB and GDP per capita, comparable to the .60 we 
obtained here. All aspects of SWB, including job satisfaction, are operating similarly across each 
cultural dimension and consequently we constrain our analyses primarily to overall SWB. With 
regard to Figure 2, most of the expected bivariate or direct relationships are largely borne out, the 
exception being masculinity and wealth, which was nonsignificant though trending negative. The 
strongest relationships, aside from the intercorrelations among the SWB measures, were 
typically those where a reciprocal relationship was hypothesized. 
 
Culture, Wealth, and Governance 
 
Hypothesis 6 was that culture would incrementally predict SWB above GDP per capita and 
governance effectiveness, having direct pathways. To test this, we used multiple regression to 
confirm that the collective effect of culture on SWB is substantial. Focusing on overall SWB, the 
1970s to 1980s period generated an R2 of .57, F(4, 20) = 6.59, p = .001; the 1990s decade 
generated an R2 of .32, F(4, 14) = 1.68, p = .20; and the 2000s decade generated an R2 of .49, 
F(4, 21) = 5.03, p = .005. Similar results are obtained with the alternate SWB indices (i.e., 
happiness, life satisfaction, job satisfaction), with a total of two nonsignificant findings out of the 
possible 12 (i.e., four SWB indices each examined in three time periods). 
 To determine if culture incrementally predicted above both GDP and governance, we 
tested culture as a present indicator and as a leading indicator, that is more causally distal. We 
did this in two sets of analyses: (a) all sets of indicators during same the time period, and (b) 
culture alone from the previous time period. If culture is operating partially through institutional 
change, we would still expect that culture from a previous time period to incrementally predict. 
For example, social capital has a much stronger relationship with SWB in the medium- and long-
term than the short-term (Bartolini & Sarracino, 2011) and, to the extent that masculinity leads to 
changes in social capital, we would expect similar lagged effects. 
 Starting with all sets of predictors from the same time period, we found that for the 1970s 
to 1980s, culture incrementally predicts (ΔR2 = .38), F(4, 15) = 4.47, p = .014, but not for the 
1990s (ΔR2 = .16), F(4, 16) = 1.42, p = .273, or the 2000s (ΔR2 = .07), F(4, 16) = 1.23, p = .339. 
That the mixed time period, 1970s to 1980s, incrementally predicts is significant as we would 
expect this if culture is indeed causally distal, containing data from two decades. When we 
lagged culture appropriately, using the data from the previous time period, there was significant 
incremental variance accounted for above GDP per capita and governance: 1990s (ΔR2 = .39), 
F(4, 20) = 4.83, p = .007; 2000s (ΔR2 = .15), F(4, 20) = 3.61, p = .023. As a robustness check, 
we conducted an additional comparison. Along with culture, we examined GDP per capita and 
governance from the previous time periods as well; this simply replicated or increased the 
variance accounted for by culture: 1990s (ΔR2 = .51), F(4, 20) = 8.21, p = .001, and 2000s (ΔR2 
= .15), F(4, 20) = 2.99, p = .044. Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individualism, Wealth, and SWB 
 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that individualism and wealth interact to predict SWB. We tested this 
moderating effect, where being simultaneously both wealthy and individualistic is desirable, 
using hierarchical regression, adding the interaction term in the second step, with all variables 
standardized. Though individualism and wealth were closely connected, variance inflation factor 
indices remain well below the critical threshold of 10, indicating acceptable collinearity. Despite 
the difficulty in detecting interaction effects in field studies (G. H. McClelland & Judd, 1993), as 
per Table 8, the interaction effect was extraordinarily strong, accounting for upward of 12% of 
the variance, except for the 1970s to 1980s (where neither GDP per capita nor individualism 
separately predicted). As per Table 8, the interaction term was positive whereas individualism’s 
term becomes negative, suggesting that individualism indeed creates happiness but perhaps only 
when there is a foundation of wealth. Confirming this, simple slope analysis, using the R’s 
Moderated Regression Package “Pequod” (Mirisola & Seta, 2016), indicated for the 2000s that 
when GDP is one standard deviation above the mean, the standardized slope for individualism is 
0.568 (p = .006), a sharply positive gradient, but −0.485 (p = .013) when GDP is one standard 
deviation below. These results are reported in Figure 3, with the 1990s providing the same 
pattern. Hypothesis 7 was supported. 
 
Power Distance, Wealth, and Governance 
 
High power distance appears to be an indicator of a nation at risk. As per Hypothesis 8, it was 
strongly connected with low SWB, less GDP per capita, and reduced governance effectiveness. 
For example, Figure 4 depicts the relationship between power distance and SWB for the decade 
2000-2009. On the top end, we have happy and low power distance countries, like the 
Netherlands and Norway. At the bottom, we have the less happy and high power distance 
countries, like China or the Philippines. 
 Hypothesis 8, as depicted in Figure 2, indicates that power distance’s relationship with 
SWB should be mediated by a combination of GDP per capita and governance. We tested the 
expected mediation using bootstrapping methodology (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), specifically 
Model 6 using 5,000 bootstrapped samples with 95% confidence intervals generated by 
PROCESS for SPSS 2.16.1 (Hayes, 2013), as depicted in Figure 5. Model 6 allows us to test 
both governance effectiveness and GDP per capita as mediators simultaneously. There are two 
major analyses to attend to. First, there is c′, which is whether there remains any direct effects of 
power distance on SWB after considering indirect effects. Second, are there any significant 
indirect effects? Model 6 considered three. Indirect Effect 1 was whether governance 
effectiveness mediates, as per: power distance → governance → SWB. Indirect Effect 2 was 
whether governance effectiveness and GDP per capita mediate, as per: power distance → 
governance → GDP per capita → SWB. Indirect Effect 3 was whether GDP per capita mediates, 
as per: power distance → GDP per capita → SWB. Figure 2, as tested by Figure 5, was 
supported when the indirect effects are significant, though the ability to detect mediation at a 
national level is invariably difficult due to sample size constraints. 
 Consistent with the analyses for Hypothesis 6, we used power distance from the previous 
time period except for the mixed era of the 1970s to 1980s. For the 2000s, the total effect of 
power distance on SWB was significant (B = −0.89), t(35) = −4.78, p < .001, but there was not a 
significant direct effect (B = −0.14), t(35) = −0.82, p = .42, indicating full mediation. Of the 
indirect effects, only Indirect Effect 1 was significant (B = −0.52, Boot SE = 0.192, BootLLCI = 
−0.994, BootULCI = −0.210). For the 1990s, the total effect of power distance on SWB was 
significant (B = −0.33), t(30) = −2.58, p = .015, but there was not a significant direct effect (B = 
−0.07), t(30) = −0.40, p = .69, again indicating full mediation. However, there was insufficient 
statistical power to test for indirect effects, with the total indirect effect also not significant (B = 
−0.56, Boot SE = 0.15, BootLLCI = −0.559, BootULCI = 0.046). For the 1970s to 1980s, the 
total effect of power distance on SWB was significant (B = −0.65), t(23) = −2.76, p = .01, and 
again there was not a significant direct effect (B = −0.15), t(23) = −0.64, p = .53, indicating full 
mediation. Although this time the total indirect effect was significant (B = −0.50, Boot SE = 
0.24, BootLLCI = −1.117, BootULCI = −0.135), there was insufficient power to determine to 
which indirect paths this can be attributed. Though the number of countries available for these 
analyses ranged from 37 to 25, we still found consistent signs of mediation, especially via 
governance effectiveness. Overall, Hypothesis 8 was supported. 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty Avoidance, SWB, and Governance 
 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that uncertainty avoidance is negatively associated with SWB, partly 
mediated by governance. As per Table 7, with the exception of job satisfaction during the 2000s 
(where r = −.41 failed to reach significance), this was strongly supported. In addition, uncertainty 
avoidance should be negatively associated with governance effectiveness, as per Figure 2. This 
was consistently found with one exception again, this time the 1970s to 1980s (where r = −.37 
failed to reach significance). Averaging across all time periods, this hypothesis was supported. 
Hypothesis 9 indicated that uncertainty avoidance should not be just connected to governance 
effectiveness, but predict SWB above it. This is similar to Hypothesis 6 but focused on a single 
variable; like our analyses for Hypothesis 6, we treated uncertainty avoidance as a leading 
indicator and used the scores from the preceding time period where possible. As per Figure 2, as 
we expected that some of governance effectiveness’ relationship with SWB is expressed through 
GDP per capita, we controlled for both using hierarchical regression, allowing uncertainty 
avoidance to enter second. Results were consistent across all time periods: 1970s to 1980s (ΔR2 
= .30), F(1, 18) = 13.71, p = .002; 1990s (ΔR2 = .31), F(1, 23) = 14.52, p = .001; and 2000s 
(ΔR2 = .18), F(1, 26) = 19.84, p < .001. Hypothesis 9 was supported. 
 
Masculinity, Wealth, and SWB 
 
To better parallel the individual-level investigation from our individual-level analyses, we 
examine masculinity’s relationships using its achievement orientation facet as well. Hypothesis 
10 suggested that masculinity should be negatively related to SWB and moderated by wealth. 
That is, for poorer countries, masculinity might have a more positive relationship. As per Table 
7, masculinity had a consistent negative relationship across SWB indices, though not all reaching 
statistical significance. Regarding achievement orientation specifically, though consistently 
trending negative, it reached significance only for overall SWB during the 2000s decade (r = 
−.35, p = .04), when the majority of the personality data were also obtained (Mõttus et al., 2010). 
Continuing, the focus becomes on whether wealth moderates this relationship. 
 We started by examining masculinity’s relationship with GDP per capita. Although, as 
per Table 7, the results were not significant for masculinity, with estimates on both sides of zero, 
for achievement orientation, the results were clearer; the relationship was consistently negative 
and significant, between −0.56 to −0.59 (N = 31 to 32). Again, Weber’s (1904/2001), D. C. 
McClelland’s (1961), and now Ferguson’s (2011) hypothesis regarding achievement motivation 
and national wealth is rejected. Furthermore, we were not able to detect any interaction effect 
suggesting that the effect of masculinity is moderated by GDP per capita, contradicting 
Arrindell’s (1998) earlier finding, nor any curvilinear relationships during any time period. 
 
Cultural Isomorphism 
 
Having completed our core individual- and national-level analyses, our final hypothesis 
predicted that isomorphism in direction should be typical, except for individualism and 
masculinity. Comparing Table 1, the individual-level data, with the last set of analyses from 
Table 7, the most recent and complete national-level data, we found directional isomorphism 
indeed typical, though with an increase in strength at the national level. For SWB, power 
distance stayed negative though increasing in strength at the national level (p < .001). 
Uncertainty avoidance and masculinity did the same (p < .05). Individualism’s relationship did 
change though, going from weakly negative at the individual level to strongly positive at the 
national level (p < .0001). The interpretation of this is difficult due to the third variable problem, 
that is national wealth creates both SWB and individualistic values. It is a clear instance, 
however, of individual-group discontinuity. 
 For wealth, we had a similar but not identical constellation of findings. Directional 
isomorphism continues for power distance and uncertainty avoidance whereas individualism 
again reverses in direction at the national level, moving from weakly negative to strongly 
positive. Masculinity, on the other hand, trended negatively with wealth at the national level (p = 
.18), opposite of its individual-level positive relationship. To examine this more closely, we 
looked at its core facet, achievement motivation. Here, the relationship was more pronounced, 
with results becoming consistently and substantively negative at the national level (p < .001). 
This appears to be a classic example of the social dilemma. Although at an individual level, 
competition and need for personal achievement are associated with wealth, at the national level, 
cooperation, trade, and trust are hallmarks of prosperity (Horváth, 2013; Ridley, 2010). 
 Following up on this finding, we also examined whether feminine countries have higher 
rates of governmental debt accumulation. Using OECD’s debt as a percentage of GDP indices, 
we examined Davidson et al.’s (2013) hypothesis that feminine countries are “renting” their 
happiness by incurring debt. Using data from the 1990s and 2000s, we failed to find support for 
Davidson et al.’s hypothesis. Although replicating results (e.g., Oishi et al., 2011) that showed 
increases in debt from the 1990s decade to the 2000s was associated with decreases in SWB (r = 
.47, N = 30), this increase in debt was positively associated with masculinity from the 1990s (r = 
.42, N = 23) but not the 2000s (r = .22, N = 23), suggesting not only that feminine countries are 
more financially prudent but again that culture precedes fiscal policy. Similarly, overall debt was 
associated with masculinity from the decade before, with 1990s masculinity predicting 2000s 
debt (r = .45, N = 23), but not with other temporal pairings (e.g., 1990s debt with 1990s 
masculinity or 1990s debt with 2000s masculinity). 
 In short, isomorphism happens but not consistently. Out of our four predicted reversals, 
three occurred, the exception being between masculinity and SWB, which stayed negative at the 
individual and national levels of analysis. Overall, Hypothesis 11 is supported. 
 
National-Level Discussion 
 
Across 48 countries and three time periods, we investigated the relationships among cultural, 
well-being, economic, and governance indices. Our different indices of SWB (i.e., Life 
Satisfaction, Happiness, Job Satisfaction) tended to perform similarly with culture, providing a 
consistent story. The happy culture tends to be individualistic and wealthy but low in power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance. Masculinity trended negatively with SWB, reaching 
significance for life satisfaction in both the 1980s and 2000s. The combined effect of culture was 
large, with the largest contributors being individualism and uncertainty avoidance. Power 
distance’s effects were mediated, especially by effective governance indicators. Accordingly, 
cultural values appear to have both causally proximal and distal properties, operating partly 
through institutional change. After controlling for economic and political indices, cultural scores 
from the preceding time period better predict SWB from the subsequent time period. 
 Overall, these results support functional and neo-institutional theory (Kara & Peterson, 
2012) over political process theory (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Although culture, such as 
power distance, should help to shape what economic and political institutions are formed, as 
Diener and Diener (1995) hypothesized, culture can incrementally predict beyond these 
institutions. Similarly, we found that individualism interacts with wealth to predict happiness, 
likely reflecting autonomy meeting opportunity, where if one has social license to pursue 
personal fulfillment, it is best to have the means to fulfill. In addition, we found that typically 
uncertainty avoidance incrementally predicts SWB above both GDP per capita and governance. 
 In all, Figure 2 was supported. Importantly, though achievement motivation was 
associated with wealth at the individual level and long thought to be critical at the national level 
(e.g., D. C. McClelland, 1961; Weber, 1904/2001), these intuitions repeatedly appear to be 
misplaced. Our results, if anything, indicate national-level masculinity, especially achievement 
orientation, was associated with less wealth, not more. Masculinity’s primary connection with 
wealth is that it appears to precede substantive increases in governmental debt. Consistent with 
masculinity being an example of the social dilemma, the concern for others associated with 
femininity can extend to concern for the financial status of future selves or subsequent 
generations. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
We found that cultural values do predict SWB above key economic and political institutions 
though related to both. Culture appears to have some causally distal pathways, where changes in 
culture lead to changes in institutions. Consequently, there can be a lag between when culture is 
assessed and its effect on SWB. For some cultural dimensions, like individualism, we would 
expect no lag, with it influencing the hedonic value of wealth in real time. Other cultural 
dimensions, like power distance, operate primarily through other institutions. The relevance of 
culture, that there are dependable relationships between values and national indicators of success, 
is potentially explosive; as Friedman (2011) notes, as it steps on the ideologies of both the right 
and the left. For example, in an address to the United Nations, President Xi Jinping, who holds 
the top office in both of China’s military and communist party, made an extended argument that 
“international values and a liberal order do not really exist” (Saunders, 2015). Unfortunately, 
political science and economics have largely operated from a political process theory 
perspective, leaving the role of national culture relatively unexplored and consequently open. 
 Eventually, we should be able to precisely answer the following two core questions. 
When does cultural change lead to institutional change and when does lasting institutional 
change need preceding cultural change? The appropriate lag between cultural change and 
institutional change is going to be a point of interest, along with potential moderators. For 
example, the average duration of a party government in parliamentary democracies is relatively 
short, approximately 600 days (Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge, 2013), indicating that under that 
political system cultural change can quickly become institutional change. On the other hand, 
dictatorships tend to be extremely long lasting and multigenerational, with some estimates 
putting their average duration at over 40 years (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 
2000). Gaddafi, for instance, was the dictator of Libya for 42 years (i.e., 1969 to 2011). As we 
proceed in this direction, we should also be better situated to address issues of causality. Though 
correlational results as obtained here cannot definitively provide causality, changes that happen 
afterward cannot predetermine those that happen before. 
 
Overall Discussion 
 
As summarized and supported by the Association for Psychological Science’s (APS) president 
Gallistel (2016), the U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13707 “emphasizes the applicability of 
psychological sciences to governance” (p. 5) as well as calls for psychology to more fully engage 
in these issues. In line with this directive, we sought to better understand the connection that 
culture has to well-being, both financial and subjective, in several large data sets, taking a 
multidisciplinary approach. We first reviewed the meta-analytic record, finding support but also 
notable lacunae. Research tended to congregate around the individualism dimension and 
sporadically examined several facets of SWB. Amending these points of neglect, we conducted a 
comprehensive survey that measured culture and a broad array of SWB elements. We also 
assembled and employed several new databases to enable national-level examination of culture 
and different measures of national success across three time periods, matching data temporally. 
The overall finding is one of relevance. Culture is closely connected to well-being, but it can be 
complex and counterintuitive, with relationships shifting from individual to national levels of 
analysis. 
 For individuals, cultural values are among the most important trait predictors of salary we 
have yet uncovered. Essentially, values related to working hard, working well with others, and 
delaying gratification are all linked to financial success. For example, each standard deviation 
increase in future orientation is associated with an extra $9,000 in salary. However, when we 
switch our focus to SWB, we find that results can change. Overall, cultural values have a 
stronger association than salary with SWB, except sensibly with pay satisfaction. This is 
primarily due to cultural values, like low individualism, that are associated with social capital or 
an interpersonal focus. Notably, achievement motivation, which predicted higher salary, also 
predicted reduced SWB. At the individual level, this provides unique direct support for 
Easterlin’s (2001) observation, that “subjective wellbeing varies directly with income and 
inversely with material aspiration” (p. 481). Alternatively, A. Smith (1759) wrote about this 
possibility in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, where he argued that the belief of wealth bringing 
happiness was a useful deception, as despite being false or at best extremely unreliable, it creates 
productivity and industry (Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein, 2005). 
 As we moved from the individual level to the national, isomorphism in direction was 
common despite the size of these associations often increasing. Wealth’s association with SWB 
shot from 0.18 at the individual level to an average 0.60 using per capita GDP. Culture kept pace 
and maintained its relative advantage, accounting for over half the variance across the decades 
and SWB indices (average R2 = .52). Culture and wealth or government effectiveness 
(corruption) indices were tightly connected (see Figure 2). Notably, there was a significant and 
strong interaction between individualism and wealth at the national level. Uncertainty avoidance 
was also important, incrementally predicting above wealth and governance/corruption. As for 
masculinity, it tended to be negatively related to SWB and predicted debt and its increase. 
 Consequently, what does a happy culture look like? Hofstede (2001) reviews the causes, 
correlates, and origins of all four cultural values. Borrowing on his comprehensive work, low 
power distance is seen more frequently in technological societies with representational 
government and a good basic educational system. There is a strong middle class and though there 
should be considerable national wealth, it is also widely distributed. Indeed, high power distance 
is partially related to economic inequality (Taras et al., 2012). Individualistic countries 
emphasize personal freedom. Individualism is associated with social mobility, a strong middle 
class again, smaller families, a well-funded educational system, urbanization, a wealthy economy 
based on individual interests (e.g., market capitalism), and again the equitable distribution of 
wealth. On the other hand, low individualism countries typically stress state socialism, a private 
life invaded by public interests, political power dominated by interest groups (rather than 
individual voters), and rigid social or occupational classes. For uncertainty avoidance, it is 
associated with xenophobia, anxiety, need for clarity and structure, emphasis on law and order, 
and the belief that what is different is dangerous. Low uncertainty avoidance is associated with 
risk-taking, openness to innovation, tolerance of diversity, comfort with ambiguity, and the belief 
in one’s ability to influence the world. Finally, we have masculinity, which had a weak 
association with SWB though trending negatively. Low masculinity or feminine countries 
believe that the wealthy pay taxes to help the poor, that there should be a comprehensive social 
safety net, that international conflicts should be resolved peacefully, and that immigrants should 
be integrated rather than assimilated. Notably, this is also the exact same constellation of cultural 
values that maximize social capital (Kaasa, 2015) and thought to be optimal for the global work 
environment (Erez & Gati, 2004). 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
The role of culture toward creating the good society has long been disputed and continues to be 
so. L. E. Harrison and Huntington’s (2000) edited book, based on the 1999 Harvard University 
Symposium, summarizes this debate. On one side, we have economists, who often take it as 
“axiomatic that appropriate economic policy effectively implemented will produce the same 
results without reference to culture” (L. E. Harrison, 2000, p. xxiv). On the other side, we have 
culture and institutions intimately intertwined, such as Etounga-Manguelle’s (2000) 
consideration of Africa’s plight, “Culture is the mother; institutions are the children” (p. 75). Our 
results here support the latter of these positions as well as inform it. 
 
Culture and institutions should be reciprocally related. We found strong connections between 
culture and institutions, with power distance and uncertainty avoidance having the most 
theoretical and empirical support for a reciprocal relationship. Though as Porter (2000) and Pryor 
(2005, 2009) review, culture is so tightly coiled with the environment that it is difficult to 
disentangle the two, some success can be had. From a functional theory perspective of culture, 
institutions create environments, which would then be best navigated by adopting a particular set 
of values. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) as well as Lehman, Chiu, and Schaller (2004) draw a 
similar conclusion from an evolutionary psychology or sociology standpoint, referencing 
“cultural fitness.” For example, Onraet, Van Assche, Roets, Haesevoets, and Van Hiel (2017) 
found that conservatives tend to be happier in countries with higher perceived threat levels. 
 From a neo-institutional perspective, as described by Kara and Peterson (2012), 
institutions can arise from the desires and values of those with influence. Alternatively, as the 
historians Durant and Durant (1968) put it, “Society is founded not on the ideals but on the 
nature of man, and the constitution of man rewrites the constitutions of states” (p. 32). The 
broader and more deeply adopted cultural values become, the harder it is to obtain a sufficient 
base to create or maintain institutions incompatible with those values (Licht et al., 2007). For 
example, colonialism creates highly extractive and hierarchical societies, which are often 
perpetuated even after independence. Top-down efforts to subsequently create institutional 
change, such as through foreign aid, tends to be subverted and ineffective (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012). However, cultural regeneration is more likely to stop when new generations, 
especially those that include members of the elite, start to adopt egalitarian beliefs and seek to 
express them in terms of institutional change (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). While this observation 
has early roots (e.g., de Tocqueville, 1835), it has been replicated many times (Dutta & 
Mukherjee, 2012; Licht et al., 2007; Zheng et al., 2012), including Mathers and Williamson’s 
(2011) finding that their cultural index influenced the success of capitalistic institutions and 
economic prosperity. 
 Combining these perspectives is what Oishi and Graham (2010) called the 
socioecological approach, where culture and institutions can see-saw back and forth, creating 
homeostasis and remarkable stability if institutions capture or become the dominant means of 
cultural transmission. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) note, despite their skepticism 
regarding the role of culture, autocratic societies highly value and take tight control of media and 
other ways in which ideas and values can be disseminated. A contemporary case is China, which 
is continuing a long tradition of using a variety of mechanisms, including education, to propagate 
cultural values that are more consistent with their political systems (Buckley, 2014; Stockmann 
& Gallagher, 2011). By restoring or, better yet, maintaining culture as part of the economic–
political process, mechanisms of change and stability become paramount, which include “the 
family, educational systems, political systems, and legislation” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 11). For 
example, the stories read to children are a potential means of cultural transmission and a 
legitimate focus of study (Engeser, Rheinberg, & Möller, 2009; Weber, 1904/2001). And as an 
illustration of both, consider North Korea’s state endorsed children’s book The Butterfly and the 
Cockerel, which “tells the story of an irascible, bullying rooster (the United States) outwitted by 
a small, virtuous butterfly (North Korea)” (Fifield, 2015). 
 
Culture and levels of analysis. Our final hypothesis assessed individual-group discontinuity 
(Oishi, 2012). Cultural values should generally be isomorphic in direction, though increasing in 
strength at the national level. Power distance and uncertainty avoidance showed this pattern. One 
notable exception to cultural isomorphism is the social dilemma, where emphasizing individual 
success can be detrimental to the overall group (Campbell & Sowden, 1985). Consistent with the 
social dilemma, individualism (which focuses on self-interest) and masculinity (which focuses 
on competition) have the potential to reverse. Individualism, however, was difficult to interpret 
due to the third variable problem; both national individualism and SWB are argued to be caused 
by wealth. Still, it represents a form of individual-group discontinuity, where individualism is 
associated at the individual level with less wealth, lower SWB, and an introverted personality, 
while at the national level, it was strongly associated with more wealth, higher SWB, and reflects 
an extroverted society. This suggests that individualism is best expressed as a broader, social 
license for independence. In other words, ideally, we live in a country where we have freedom to 
choose our own path, and then be the type of person who independently chooses to value 
community. 
 Masculinity showed mixed isomorphism. For SWB, it was consistent both theoretically 
and empirically at both an individual and a national level of analysis: negative. The social capital 
generated by feminity, such as helping or trusting others, predicts happiness. This included 
achievement orientation, where despite its positive relationship with pay, it predicted decreased 
satisfaction, including decreased satisfaction with pay itself. This favors the economic 
explanation (i.e., the happy peasant/frustrated achiever theory) over the psychological; the added 
work that achievement orientation entails take its toll, with those part-time employed about as 
happy as those full-time, likely because increased leisure opportunities is a compensating factor. 
 For wealth, masculinity, particularly its facet of achievement motivation, appears to be a 
classic example of the social dilemma. Where it was positively related to wealth at the individual 
level, at the national level it was negative. And aside from the strong negative correlation with 
GDP per capita itself, masculinity predicted increases in governmental debt. Despite several 
proponents arguing that achievement orientation remains isomorphic at both individual and 
national levels of analysis (e.g., Ferguson, 2011; D. C. McClelland, 1961; Weber, 1904/2001), it 
is increasingly hard to maintain that masculinity is a characteristic of a successful nation, either 
in terms of financial prosperity, government effectiveness, or happiness. Though masculinity is 
connected with financial success at the individual level, it appears that generalizing this 
expectation to nations is among our most enduring and widespread instances of the “ecological 
fallacy,” where relationships fail to replicate across levels of analysis (Ashkanasy, 2011; Taras et 
al., 2010). 
 In all, this suggests our personal values can be an undependable guide for preferred 
societal values. Our capacity to take this perspective, however, is likely limited. Lived 
experience will often stress the financial benefits of competition over cooperation, despite a solid 
case can be made for prosperity being the result of cooperative trade, trust, and reciprocal 
altruism (Horváth, 2013; Ridley, 2010). 
 
Uncertainty avoidance and SWB. Most societies appear to have greater levels of uncertainty 
avoidance than their environment warrants. Steven Pinker, for example, reviewing the historical 
decline of violence, concludes “we are in the most peaceful time of our species’ existence” 
(Rochester, 2010, p. 341). Still, levels of anxiety, which is the central component of uncertainty 
avoidance, have been steadily rising, particularly in the United States. As Twenge (2000) notes, 
“The average American child in the 1980s reported more anxiety than child psychiatric patients 
in the 1950s” (p. 1007). Several researchers have argued that this is not an accident, that there is 
a manufactured “Culture of Fear” (Füredi, 2006). 
 As mentioned, this partly reflects the politicization of fear. Aside from the inherent level 
of uncertainty, high or low, there are political advantages toward manipulating it. It also reflects 
market forces as losses loom larger than gains— fear is a useful frame to gain media attention or 
expand a viewing audience (Glassner, 2009). In short, there is a firm psychological basis to the 
journalistic adage “if it bleeds, it leads.” The constant media reinforcement of vivid but rare 
dangers creates what Kahneman (2011) terms an availability cascade, which “inevitably leads to 
gross exaggeration of minor threats” (p. 144). As a result, we get irrationally heightened 
uncertainty avoidance, where people fear dying, for example, less than they fear dying of a 
terrorist attack (i.e., a subset of dying). This becomes particularly pernicious when rarity results 
in the media becoming the primary source of information on the matter. In the absence of 
disconfirming personal experience (i.e., the contact effect), those having the least contact with 
minority or immigrant groups are among the most likely to fear them (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2013). 
 The politics and commercialization of fear are potentially two pathways where a society 
artificially becomes more fearful and less happy. Having this knowledge, however, does not tell 
us what to do with it. For example, if the media is indeed creating a culture of fear to expand 
their viewing audience (e.g., vastly overstating the extent of Ebola concerns in the United States; 
Evans, 2014), should we regulate what is broadcast to increase national well-being? Though 
there may be incentives in societies for making people less happy, as we later discuss in the 
limitations, this should not necessarily result in intervention. 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 
Spanning multiple data sets, individual and national levels of analysis, four decades, and 48 
countries or regions, this present study is among the most comprehensive attempts to 
quantitatively assess the relationship between culture and SWB. Still, a number of questions 
remain unanswered. First, there is the standard issue of measurement, which is almost always an 
area of contention regardless of the topic. This extends to our measure of GDP per capita, with 
some recommending GNI (Gross National Income) per capita as a better measure of wealth 
(Delhey & Kroll, 2013), to debates on the best measure of governance (Voigt, 2013), though 
previous cultural investigation has largely found them as interchangeable (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2010). We focus on the newly developed SWB and cultural indices. 
 Regarding the aggregation of Veenhoven’s WDH, this is presently the most extensive 
effort to make a comprehensive international assessment of SWB. However, the underlying 
surveys it is based on do contain measurement errors. As Diener and Seligman (2009) argue, 
“Current measurement of well-being is haphazard, with different studies assessing different 
concepts in different ways” (p. 202). This may have acted to our benefit though, where the meta-
analytic aggregation of multiple methodologies reduced the issue of acquiescence. Also, to some 
extent, this concern is ameliorated by Veenhoven’s effort to place all the scales on a common 0 
to 10 metric as well as our own efforts to mathematically equate different scales. Still, 
refinements to the process are being made and the database is continuously being expanded 
(Kalmijn, Arends, & Veenhoven, 2011). Given the increased interest and measurement in 
national well-being over the last decade (Delhey & Kroll, 2013), future aggregations of the 
WDH could improve our measurement base, such as increasing the number of overlapping 
points, which facilitates linear equating. 
 We also used Hofstede’s framework to conceptualize culture. Although the model has 
been among the most popular and has been validated in numerous subsequent studies, it is not 
without limitations (Blodgett, Bakir, & Rose, 2008; McSweeney, 2013). Most research has been 
done with individualism, often more than all other values combined. Rectifying this favoritism 
should be fruitful (Taras et al., 2010). Also, our national-level data is meta-analytically 
aggregated from scores of cultural scales, of which the scales we used for our individual-level 
analyses are a subset. While this does broaden the assessment domain at the national level, it 
injects a degree of measurement variance, diminishing how well individual and national-level 
data can be compared. For uncertainty avoidance, where we thought this was a concern, we 
employed metaBUS data to compensate for the absence of the anxiety facet at the individual 
level. Ideally, we would have both individual level and national level fully nested, allowing for 
hierarchical linear modeling. Though we cannot retroactively create such a data set, the World 
Value Survey continues to be conducted on a regular basis and it can be configured to provide 
analogs for at least one of Hofstede’s dimensions (Minkov & Hofstede, 2012). 
 As an additional measurement issue, most of our work was at the overall dimension level, 
with possible differential effects at the facet or subdimension level, particularly for uncertainty 
avoidance which has aspects tapping into both anxiety and need for structure and rules. Similar, 
different relationship between SWB and facets have been found at the personality level, 
suggesting a better understanding of the underlying processes available with a more detailed 
examination (Albuquerque, de Lima, Matos, & Figueiredo, 2012; Quevedo & Abella, 2011; 
Steel et al., 2008). Furthermore, with its focus on the cultural values identified by Hofstede, our 
analysis did not include other values that may be equally relevant. Other popular models of 
culture may also be useful for explaining the effects of culture on satisfaction, such as Ralston et 
al.’s (2011) update of the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1994) or the GLOBE project 
(House et al., 2004). Ye, Ng, and Lian (2015) have made some inroads with the latter of these 
two and though not examining GDP per capita or governance, they did find similar results for 
power distance and individualism though opposite for uncertainty avoidance (which notably 
focused on the rule compliance rather than the anxiety facet of the construct). Taras et al. (2009) 
provide an extensive list of other cultural values worthy of study and consumerism or 
materialism, argued as beneficial by Ferguson (2011), is worth reexamination; others argue that 
materialism is actually associated with overspending and excessive debt, leading to economic 
collapse (Garðarsdóttir & Dittmar, 2012). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) make an extended case 
that successful nations shift into a postmaterialistic mindset, similar to Maslow’s need-pyramid 
perspective, with countries that exemplify materialism are actually at the very bottom of the 
socioeconomic ladder. Also, W. Ng and Diener (2014) conducted an extensive Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling study on SWB using Gallup World Poll data, finding that while postmaterialist 
needs (i.e., respect, autonomy, social support) increase in importance for wealthier countries, 
materialism is consistently negatively related with SWB. Finally, Ahuvia (2002) makes a 
theoretical argument that those connecting consumption with SWB at a national level are doing 
so erroneously, confusing the construct with individualism. 
 In particular, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) should be examined (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009). Given that moral values overlap with cultural values (Sverdlik, Roccas, & Sagiv, 
2012), it is unsurprising that MFT’s typology of values overlaps with Hofstede’s model (e.g., 
power distance and MFT’s authority dimension or femininity and MFT’s caring dimension), but 
it also extends it (e.g., MFT’s sanctity dimension), is similarly related to political ideology, and 
can be examined at a national level (Graham, Meindl, & Beall, 2012). Unfortunately, only 
Hofstede’s framework has the longevity and popularity to generate the substantial body of 
empirical literature needed for a well-estimated meta-analysis. As the other models gain 
acceptance and grow a foundational body of work, we may be able to address this gap and use 
these alternative frameworks to revisit the research questions addressed in the present study. 
 Related to morality, as a topic of study is the role of religion and the accompanied 
cultural values and practices it promotes. Although we did not support Ferguson’s (2011) 
backing of the Protestant work ethic hypothesis, he did take a broader perspective that religions 
matter in general, from Confucianism to Islam to Catholicism, and that other religious-related 
cultural elements play an important role, such as the development of prosocial traits of trust and 
honesty. The exact effect of religion is in dispute, with findings indicating both a positive 
(Inglehart et al., 2008) and negative (Oishi & Schimmack, 2010) association with SWB, possibly 
hinging on whether the religion is hierarchical in nature (Kaasa, 2015). In the same way that 
political perspectives can be adaptive, depending on the environment, there is a body of scholars 
who argue the same for religious values (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 2016; Sosis, 2009; Wilson, 
2005). For example, K. Lee and Ashton (2012) credit religion for dissolving in the United States 
the otherwise dependably negative relationship between conservatism and honestyhumility. As 
Purzycki and Sosis (2009) conclude, religious behaviors can enhance long-term relationships and 
trust, which in turn “sustains communities and promotes social coordination and cooperative 
behavior” (p. 253-254). Through its development of cultural values, religion can potentially be a 
partner in forming political and economic institutions (Chandan, 2013; Fukuyama, 1995; Laver, 
2010). 
 In addition to the cultural effects of religion, we would also want to take a closer look at 
the relationship between values and practices in general. At the individual level, values typically 
precede actions, providing the motivation to enact them (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
However, as Taras, Steel & Kirkman (2010) review, consistent with the reciprocal aspects of our 
model, the relationship at a national level can be more complex, with “recent research showing 
that the relationship between values and practices can be a two-way street, and that values can be 
a consequence of practices rather than a cause” (p. 1334). To better translate this research into 
public policy, we need to have a better idea of whether values cause or are caused by practices, 
particularly government and political institutions (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Pryor, 2005; 
Voigt & Park, 2008), a notably understudied topic at a quantitative level (Steel & Taras, 2010). 
For example, determinants of the speed and success at which immigrants acculturate to their host 
country, essentially person–nation fit, is almost completely neglected at a value level (Taras et 
al., 2013), despite person–organization fit having a well-developed and deep history (Kristof-
Brown et al., 2005). With regular migration crises, such as with Syria at the time of this writing 
(Yazgan, Utku, & Sirkeci, 2015), this alone justifies closer examination of the topic. 
 We should also seek to establish optimal levels of culture and supporting institutional 
environments. Partly, this reflects the problem of value-pluralism, where moral values can be 
individually good but still in conflict with one another. One classic manifestation involves power 
distance and individualism as both appear to benefit from wealth and its equitable distribution. 
Though wealth and equality tend to be positively related, at some extreme point, efforts to more 
evenly enable prosperity throughout a society (e.g., through assisting entrepreneurial activities, 
enabling the acquisition of skills, or limiting any negative rent seeking practices of plutocrats) 
will stop creating wealth and start destroying it. Similarly, individualistic countries emphasize 
market capitalism and freedom of choice but, as the conservative icon Friedrich Hayek adeptly 
argues, equality before the law and equality of opportunity necessarily result in material 
inequality, that is the rich and the poor (Hayek & Hamowy, 2011). There must be some optimal 
level or broad band of equality or inequality, with excessive equality happening at extreme forms 
of socialism (e.g., the former USSR or Mao TseTung’s China). Despite this caution, we 
presently do not precisely know when this occurs as it fails to manifest within our database of 
countries, as per Figure 4, which does not yet indicate any downward effect that suggests we 
have yet reached excess. 
 Finally, we can question to what degree happiness should be an indicator for a good life. 
Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker, and Garbinsky (2013) argue that a happy life is not necessarily a 
meaningful one, and Henriques, Kleinman, and Asselin (2014) propose a four-factor model of 
well-being comprised of objective and subjective elements. This position replicates at a national 
level, with Kroll and Delhey (2013) arguing for a similar array of indicators. There is 
considerable debate regarding what weights each indicator should be given (Eckersley, 2009; De 
Prycker, 2010; Tov & Diener, 2007), particularly regarding the role of freedom in a desirable 
society. Famously, Isaiah Berlin (1969) warned against an extremely feminine society described 
as a “nanny” state, where efforts to ensure our well-being impinge upon our liberty. If this is 
acceptable, the question becomes how far we can extend this principle. Sometimes we favor 
benevolent paternalism, such as helmet laws, and other times we favor freedom, such as the 
rejection of New York City’s giant-soda ban (Fairchild, 2013; Huang, 2010). This complicates 
matters. First is simply practical, that there is the strong possibility of ephemeral or unintended 
consequences (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2011), with those aforementioned helmet laws 
reducing fatalities mainly by getting people to ride bicycles less. Second, because freedom can 
be valued for itself, aside from its benefits or costs, there is no single notion of the good society 
(e.g., hedonic versus eudaimonia; McMahan & Estes, 2011). Some nations and people will value 
liberty more than happiness or wealth, such as Heath (2002) noting that “When given a choice 
between liberty and efficiency, Americans consistently choose liberty, even when it makes life 
more difficult for them” (p. 7) or Savani and Rattan (2012) concluding that “the culturally valued 
concept of choice contributes to the maintenance of wealth inequality” (p. 1). Returning to Isaiah 
Berlin (1990), he himself later came to understanding this tradeoff explicitly: 
 
liberty—without some modicum of which there is no choice and therefore no possibility 
of remaining human as we understand the word—may have to be curtailed to make way 
for social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to shelter the homeless, to 
leave room for the liberty of others, to allow justice or fairness to be exercised. (p. 12) 
 
Consequently, as this research field progresses and we develop a better understanding of the 
interplay among culture and institutions as well as their outcomes of wealth and happiness, it still 
doesn’t definitively provide us with what we should do with this knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Originating during the French Revolution and the fight for democracy, the tripartite motto of 
France, “Liberté, égalité, fraternité,” appears to be well chosen. To the extent that liberty 
represents the freedom associated with individualism, equality refers to low power distance, and 
fraternity (despite the gender reversal) represents the concern for others associated with low 
masculinity, France’s slogan champions cultural values associated with the happy nation. If the 
motto could be expanded to include “low uncertainty avoidance”— or perhaps “faible anxiété”—
the parallelism with cultural values and the use of consonance would be complete. The extent 
that other nations will also adopt these values as ideals is not entirely clear. Consistent with the 
research into wellbeing indicators (Diener & Seligman, 2009), cultural values are inherently 
value-laden, making them politically controversial (e.g., Altemeyer, 1988; Federico, Hunt, & 
Ergun, 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Oishi et al., 2011; Okulicz-Kozaryn et al., 2014). 
 The happy culture does not equally represent both sides of the political spectrum, and 
thus requires a balance among competing forces. This position is probably best summarized by 
Murray Rothbard (1965) who, in the first editorial of the libertarian journal Left and Right, 
concluded that neither political party had a monopoly on wisdom. More recently, the political 
philosopher Jason Brennan (2012) argues educated and informed voters, those who vote well, 
tend to support public policy that spans the political spectrum. Still, exactly how to achieve “this 
best balance” or optimize the factors that create the happy culture depends in part on each 
nation’s particular state of affairs and will continue to be debated. We hope here to add clarity to 
the debate and to help shape the discourse more productively. 
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